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Host: University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland  









Pre-fPET mini-workshop: Reimagining 
the Future of Engineering 




(see website for RSVP details) 
1:00 pm 
Registration Open 




OPENING SESSION  
Location: Zupnick Lecture Hall 
 
 Framing Remarks 
Zachary Pirtle and Guru Madhavan 
Conference Co-Chairs 
 Welcome from the Host 
Darryll J. Pines,  
Dean, A. James Clark School of Engineering University 
of Maryland, College Park  
2:15 pm 
KEYNOTE 
Engineering Design Principles in Culture 
and in the Architecture of Nature  
Location: Zupnick Lecture Hall 
 





3:30 pm CONCURRENT SESSIONS I  
 
TRACK A: Philosophy of Engineering  
Location: Kay Board Room I 
Moderated by:  
 
I-A1: Mark Bourgeois,  
An exploration of applying self-determination theory as 
general technology design criteria 
I-A2: Elihu Gerson and Alok Srivastava 
Reconciliation in multi-disciplinary engineering projects: 
The role of scaffolds and brackets 
I-A3: Ira Monarch, Muriel Mambrini-Doudet, 
Anne-Francoise Schmid and Eswaran 
Subrahmanian 
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TRACK B: Ethics I 
Location: Kay Board Room II 
Moderated by:  
I-B1: Ken Archer 
Grounding AI Ethics in Bayesian AI 
I-B2: Pieter Vermaas 
Engineering Ethics for Normative Design 
I-B3: Ximeng Chen 
How to integrate public participation in engineering —a 
study with the morphological approach 
 
TRACK C: Case Studies 
Location: Pepco Room 
Moderated by:  
 
I-C1: Rick Shang 
Competition and the Creation of Neuroimaging: The 
History of Positron Emission Tomography 1976-1985 
I-C2: Zahra Meghani 
The regulation of a genetically engineered mosquito as a 
pesticide: A case study 
I-C3: Shawn Kimmel 
Building trust in AI system design and operation: A 
Perspective from Automated Driving System 
 
 
TRACK D: Ethics for New Technologies 
Location: Zupnick Lecture Hall 
Moderated by:  
I-D1: Richard Wilson, Michael Nestor and Richard 
Wilson 
CRISPR and Anticipatory Biomedical Ethics 
I-D2: Steven Umbrello 
Intuiting Safe Design: Strengthening Design-for-Values 
Frameworks 
I-D3: Ed Birrane and UMBC students 






7:00 pm Networking and Happy Hour  
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Breakfast on your own  
9:00 am CONCURRENT SESSIONS II  
 
TRACK A: Philosophy of Engineering  
Location: Kay Board Room I 
Moderated by:  
 
II-A1: Brian Hanley 
What Caused The Bhopal Disaster? Causal Selection in 
Safety Engineering 
II-A2: Stanley Kranc 
When is the Past Reality? 
II-A3: Albrecht Fritzsche 
Revisiting Hegel’s traces: shifts of determinacy in the 
course of the digital transformation 
 
 
TRACK B: Ethics II: Citizen 
Engagement 
Location: Kay Board Room II 
Moderated by:  
II-B1: Mahmud Farooque, Jason Lloyd, David 
Tomblin and Kimberly Quach 
Flipping the Model: Using Citizen Concerns to Frame 
Public Deliberations on Science, Technology, and 
Engineering Questions 
II-B2: David Tomblin, Jen Schneider and Mahmud 
Farooque 
Expertise and Participatory Technology Assessment: 
Going Beyond Laboratory Studies to Understand the 
Expert/Lay Divide 
II-B3: Siddhartha Roy and Marc Edwards 





TRACK C: Reconsidering Engineering 
Location: Pepco Room 
Moderated by:  
II-C1: Thomas Siller, Gearold Johnson and Russell 
Korte 
Why engineers must be more than problem solvers. 
II-C2: Terry Bristol 
The Middle Way Evolution of Engineering Design 
II-C3: Wade Robison 
Integrating ethics into the Grand Challenges 
 
 
TRACK D: Education and  
Other Perspectives  
Location: Zupnick Lecture Hall  
Moderated by:  
II-D1: Hengli Zhang and Qin Zhu 
Teaching Engineering Ethics in the Chinese Context: 
Understanding Instructor Perceptions of Engineering 
Ethics Education at Chinese Engineering Universities 
II-D2: Andrés Santa-María 
The place of Philosophy in Engineering degree 
programs 
II-D3: Bono Shih 
Engineering Ethics without Engineers? How Western 
Philosophy Might Learn from Engineering Ethics in 
Taiwan 
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11:00 am CONCURRENT SESSIONS III  
 
TRACK A: Engineering Narratives  
Location: Kay Board Room I 
Moderated by:  
 
III-A1: Dominic Berry 
Narrative knowing and engineering: a case from the 
intersection of biology and engineering 
III-A2: Travis Babikoff and Devlin Montfort 
Epistemic Practices in Engineering 
III-A3: Tara Gonzalez 




TRACK B: Ethics III:  
Values in Design 
Location: Kay Board Room II 
Moderated by:  
III-B1: Rider Foley, Elise Barrella, Heather 
Kirkvold and Rodney Wilkins 
Exploring knowledge, values, rationale and how they 
influence engineering and technology: The case of the 
Atlantic Coast Pipeline 
III-B2: Taylor Stone 
Towards a Darker Future? Designing Values into the 
Next Generation of Streetlights 
III-B3: Zhenging Zhang 
Robots as Others Expectations Moral Agents:From 




TRACK C: Aerospace  
and Epistemology 
Location: Pepco Room 
Moderated by:  
III-C1: Matthew Shindell 
Testing Technologies for Space: The Case of the Kepler 
Technology Demonstrator 
III-C2: Edison R. Silva, Domício Proença Jr. and 
Roberto Bartholo 
On the philosophy of planning in asset-intensive 
maintenance campaigns 
III-C3: Stephen B. Johnson 
Philosophical Observations and Applications in Systems 
and Aerospace Engineering 
 
 
TRACK D: On Transformations 
Location: Zupnick Lecture Hall 
Moderated by:  
III-D1: Mamadou Seck, Miguel Angel Toro Jarrin 
Understanding Practical Problems in the Technological 
Age 
III-D2: Fernando Nascimento 
Software and Metaphors: the hermeneutical dimensions 
of Software Development 
III-D3: Sascha Julian Oks and Albrecht Fritzsche 
More than new technical devices: a semiotic look at the 









Challenges in Engineering Life Support 
Systems for Interplanetary Travel 
Location: Zupnick Lecture Hall 
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3:30 pm CONCURRENT SESSIONS IV  
 
TRACK A: Philosophy of Engineering  
Location: Kay Board Room I 
Moderated by:  
 
IV-A1: Maarten Franssen 
Philosophy of engineering and philosophy of 
technology: separation or integration? 
IV-A2: Christopher French 
Constructing Carnap as Conceptual Engineer in the 
World of Data Science 
IV-A3: Michael Poznic, Claudia Eckert, Rafaela 
Hillerbrand and Martin Stacey 
Jet Engines, Design Teams and the Imagination: 
Designing as Playing Games of Make-Believe 
 
 
TRACK B: Ethics IV 
Location: Kay Board Room II 
Moderated by:  
IV-B1: David E. Goldberg 
Revisiting Schön’s Reflection-in-Action in Transforming 
the Practice of Engineering Education 
IV-B2: Darshan Karwat 
Self-reflection for Activist Engineering 
IV-B3: Kathleen Vogel 
Bringing the National Security Agency into the 
Classroom: Ethical Reflections on Academia-
Intelligence Agency Partnerships 
IV-B4: Brian Dewhurst 
Engineering at what cost, to what purpose? The U.S. 
federal budget process as a site for responsible 
innovation and engineering ethics work 
 
 
TRACK C: Language and Art 
Location: Pepco Room 
Moderated by:  
IV-C1: Rick Evans 
“Can Saying Make It So?” J. L. Austin and the 
Philosophical Foundations for the Modern 
Construction of the Role of Communication in 
Engineering Practice. 
IV-C2: Anne Meixner 
A Thousand and One Engineering Stories 
IV-C3: Misha Rabinovich and Caitlin Foley 
The Alchemy of Maintenance Art 
 
 
TRACK D: Emerging Technologies 
Location: Zupnick Lecture Hall 
Moderated by:  
IV-D1: Marion Boulicault 
Measuring Emerging Technologies: The Case of Brain-
Computer Interfaces and the Illiteracy Metric 
IV-D2: Janella Baxter 
Is CRISPR-Cas Really Revolutionary? 
IV-D3: David Morrow 
Solar Geoengineering: A Case Study in Slippery Slope 







Conference Dinner Reception and 
Keynote  
(with cash bar) 
Location: The Hotel at the University of 
Maryland 
Talk and Discussion: 
Malka Older, author of the novels Infomocracy 
and Null States 
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Breakfast on your own  
9:00 am CONCURRENT SESSIONS V  
 
TRACK A: Intersubjectivity  
Location: Kay Board Room I 
Moderated by:  
 
V-A1: Ayush Gupta, Chandra Turpen, Andrew Elby 
and Thomas Phillip 
The dynamics of perspective-taking in discussions on 
socio-technical issues 
V-A2: Rider Foley and Araba Dennis 
From deontological to interpretative: Self-reflection and 
recognition of others 
V-A3: Dylan Wittkower 
Applying Interpersonal Mental Models of Privacy to the 
Internet of Things 
 
 
TRACK B: Ethics V 
Location: Kay Board Room II 
Moderated by:  
V-B1: Carl Mitcham 
Is an Engineered Life Worth Living for Humans? 
V-B2: Joshua Earle 
Morphological Freedom: Potential and Normativity in 
Transhumanism 
V-B3: Damien Williams 
Constructing Situated and Social Knowledge: Ethical, 





TRACK C: Trust and Privacy I 
Location: Pepco Room 
Moderated by:  
V-C1: Daniel Susser 
Online Manpulation: Is Transparency the Cure? 
V-C2: Yan Teng and Guowei Jiang 
From interpersonal trust to trust in technology itself: 
blockchain as a responsible design material 
V-C3: Yvette Pearson and Jason Borenstein 




TRACK D: Materiality  
Location: Zupnick Lecture Hall 
Moderated by:  
V-D1: Manjari Chakrabarty 
Prehistoric stone artifacts and epistemic complexity 
V-D2: Erik Nelson 
Humans, Trees, and Ethics 
V-D3: Anders Buch 
Socio-materiality and modes of inquiry 
10:30 am Break  
 
11:00 am CONCURRENT SESSIONS VI  
 
TRACK A: Linear Models in  
Engineering  
Location: Kay Board Room I 
Moderated by:  
 
VI-A1: Marci Baranski 
The Green Revolution and Enduring Technology-
Driven Approaches to Agricultural Development and 
Climate Adaptation 
VI-A2: Zachary Pirtle 
Epistemology driving policy?: Project Hindsight and the 
role of empirical studies in informing debates on the 
linear model of innovation 
VI-A3: Paul Ceruzzi 
Moore's law and Technological Determinism, Revisited 




TRACK B: Ethics VI 
Location: Kay Board Room II 
Moderated by:  
VI-B1: Daniel McLaughlin 
Judgement, Engineering and Engineering Judgement 
VI-B2: Tonatiuh Rodriguez-Nikl 
Technology, Uncertainty, and the Good Life: 
Rediscovering Lessons from Ancient Philosophy 
VI-B3: Eddie Conlon 
How many kinds of Engineering Ethics? 
 
TRACK C: Trust and Privacy II 
Location: Pepco Room 
Moderated by:  
 
VI-C1: Jason Borenstein and Joseph Herkert 
Ethics and Chatbots: Beyond Privacy and Rogue AI 
VI-C2: Jo Ann Oravec 
Interdisciplinary Analysis of Engineering and Business 
Initiatives Involving Personal Privacy and Information 
Control: Implications for Consumer Participation 
VI-C3: Malka Older interviewed by Elise Barrella 
Infomocracy and the societal implications of social 










Why Engineers and Philosophers Should 
Learn to Love a Good Technological Fix 
Location: Zupnick Lecture Hall 
 




Synthesis and Reflections 
Location: Zupnick Lecture Hall 



















Mark L Bourgeois, University of Notre Dame 
An Exploration of Applying Self-Determination Theory as General Technology Design Criteria 
Engineers are increasingly aware of the social and ethical stakes of their designs; or, at least, increasingly 
aware that they have them.  Academic and popular media coverage of issues such as the psychological 
impact of social media consumption and the economic and social impacts of impending widespread 
automation such as driverless cars have presumably disabused many engineers of the notion that their 
technology is in all ways an unalloyed good. 
But if so, this recognition only highlights another, equally serious gap: the lack of any framework or 
principles with which to grapple with these impacts, or to encode them as articulable criteria that can 
factor into complex design decisions.  Philosophers, historians and sociologists have had much to say 
about the complex and nuanced social ramifications of technology.  But few if any of these efforts have 
been oriented towards handing design engineers a tool kit to aid their practice and improve these 
impacts.   
While any such simplified heuristic would undoubtedly be inadequate to fully capturing a technology’s 
full import in society, it could be a significant improvement on not having any relevant actionable social 
and ethical guidance whatsoever.  It may also allow engineers to begin conceiving of such issues as 
relevant, indeed, vital design parameters – rather than as mere ineffables or unaccountable personal 
judgments.   
One potentially promising candidate for constructing such a tool kit comes from psychology rather than 
philosophy or STS.  Psychologists Ed Deci and Richard Ryan's Self-Determination Theory of motivation 
posits that human beings require the full exercise of three primary capacities in order to flourish: 
Autonomy, Competence, and Relation.  Autonomy refers to the need to feel that one is the originator or 
author of one’s own actions and choices, rather than being externally controlled by others or by binding 
rules. Competence is the need to develop and exercise a complex skill, and overcome challenges in its 
exercise.  Relation refers to our need to develop significant and meaningful relationships with other 
people, and to feel known and respected within them.  Significantly, decades of international empirical 
research have backed up these conclusions.  
As a succinct, empirically-based and relatively tractable picture of human flourishing, these principles 
could potentially be conscripted to begin roughly analyzing the social and ethical impacts of a design 
schema.  
Even a cursory examination of current designs of, for example, social media or automation with 
reference to these principles reveals significant issues – from automation that encourages both passive 
overreliance and deskilling to the thin connections of social media substituting for real relation.   Such a 
toolkit would clearly not be a panacea, and like any design criteria it would have to contend with 
pressing financial incentives and limitations.  But the development and implementation of such 
guidelines could help make these tradeoffs more visible to those who must make them on our behalf, 
and could conceivably help them to make ethically better tradeoffs.  
I-A1
Deci, Edward L. and Flaste, Richard. Why We Do what We Do: Understanding Self-motivation. Penguin 
books, New York, NY. 1995 
Reconciliation in multi-disciplinary engineering projects: the role of scaffolds and brackets 
Elihu M. Gerson and Alok Srivastava 
Engineering projects bring together many different specialties and other stakeholders. 
Participants from different worlds typically differ in their conventional practices. They 
characterize the world somewhat differently, frame problems in different ways, deploy different 
models, use different techniques to work with data, and respond differently to the concerns of 
different audiences. Moreover, these differences are embedded in larger institutional contexts, 
which impose restrictions on what can be attempted as well as limits on who can participate, and 
on what terms (cf, e.g., Johnson 2017). As a result, when multiple worlds participate in a single 
project, they often don’t complement one another effectively. The resulting local and particular 
issues must be reconciled if the project is to continue. Agreement on every point is not necessary, 
nor is a general theoretical solution (Griesemer 2006); participants need only do what’s needed 
to let the project continue. Reconciliation in particular projects means that participants face 
trade-offs posed by the need to accommodate others. Understanding the reconciliation process in 
a general way requires developing means for analyzing these trade-offs that are not limited to 
any particular context. In this paper, we illustrate our approach with descriptions of two recent 
bioengineering programs aimed at building general platforms for synthetic biology projects: a 
minimal bacterial genome (Hutchison et al. 2016), and a synthetic yeast genome (Richardson et 
al. 2017).  
As projects develop and participants interact, they employ some combination of tactics in order 
to reconcile their positions within a larger institutional context that scaffolds the project. 
Scaffolds act as taken-for-granted contexts that provide many resources and restrictions to a 
project; for example, standards for electrical current. Although specialization and standardization 
is the traditional engineering strategy of reconciliation, articulating activities must also be 
coordinated through mechanisms of co-adaptation and translation (brackets; Gerson 2008) that 
enable effective, efficient and equitable joint efforts among multiple specialties. In practice, this 
means that participants negotiate and revise their own approaches as they come to understand 
one another’s limits, requirements, and capacities. Thus each participant learns to anticipate 
others, and adjust accordingly. Moreover, the reconciliation tactics and arrangements used in a 
project are themselves progressively improved over time, so that joint efforts become (other 
things equal) better integrated and more reliable.  
To the extent that a reconciliation tactic is effective in a particular project, it can be used and 
modified in similar projects, and thus gain a degree of generality. These more general 
arrangements can become the basis of the common pool of techniques, models, and concepts that 
form the basis of new or reformed specialties and technologies. For example, bacterial plasmids 
have evolved into an extensive toolbox of shuttle vectors to transfer modified genes between 
organisms.  
I-A2
Generic Scaffolding for a Non-Standard Engineering Design Ethic 
Our view is not to see engineering from the point of view of philosophy, nor is it to see 
philosophy from the point of view of engineering. We are offering neither a philosophy of 
engineering, nor a re-engineering of philosophy, nor a philosophy from an evolutionary point of 
view, nor do we see engineering as an applied science. Moreover, our focus is not on validation 
or justification. Rather, we are proposing that the relationships among philosophy, engineering, 
science and the arts need also to be seen from an interdisciplinary, concept genericity 
perspective, where philosophy, the disciplines or crafts are on equal footing, no one dominating 
or making decisions for any of the others, where the emphasis is on producing unstable 
integrative objects seen from the future or played within virtual environments or multiply 
configured in different philo/science/engineering theoretical fictions. This is not to say that the 
other perspectives do not have an important role or are insignificant, but rather that this 
interdisciplinary generic perspective sets in relief issues that are usually not considered, though 
are also important.  
Our aim is to forge new relationships between philosophies, the sciences, the arts and 
engineering through a reconfiguration of design and philosophy into a unilateral duality of non-
standard design/philosophy. From a non-standard design/philosophy orientation, both human 
subjects and objects are taken as indefinite and generic, capable of assuming determinations not 
countenanced in standard disciplines. This is not to say that standard disciplines and standard 
philosophy are ignored. Quite the contrary, they are hyper-retained but decomposed into flows of 
fragmentary materials that can be recomposed into non-disciplinarily flows of superposed 
counterpoint or inchoate harmony or melody. For example, conceptual fragments from quantum 
theory become entangled with those of philosophy (identity and superposition), a study of space-
time, biology, information and computing, psychology, linguistics, and fiction. These 
compositions can split into unstable and uncertain integrative objects and also into equally 
unstable heretic collectives or perhaps even forgo splitting into a subject/object duality. In the 
process of conjugating relationships between philosophies, the sciences, engineering and the arts 
a generic epistemology emerges that is at once aesthetic and ethical. 
Collective identity, generic decomposition and recomposition and architecting an 
interdisciplinary generic space to house and support collective and compositional processes, 
techniques and apparatuses are mutually formed and produced. This generic work needs 
scaffolding at the boundary between generic space inside and contexts outside to moderate and 
modulate the entrenched philosophic and disciplinary forces that seek to impose certain human 
and object identities. The scaffolding both protects the generic non-disciplinary space of non-
standard design from the impositional effects of outside contexts and also enables materials from 
the outside to be used generically inside. For example, the individual as homo-economicus can 
be refashioned as homo-non-standard-economicus and value as a competitive advantage can be 
refashioned as value for generic humanity. Non-standard philo/design fictions are modes of 
resistance to the well-entrenched disciplinary and philosophic stories repeated as sound-bites in 
our mediatized world that also point toward a new non-standard design engineering ethic. 
I-A3
Ira Monarch, Muriel Mambrini-Doudet, Anne-Francoise Schmid and Eswaran Subrahmanian
Grounding AI Ethics in Bayesian AI 
Ken Archer 
Chief Data Officer, Thunder 
MA Philosophy, Catholic University of America 
A central obstacle to adoption of AI ethics by practitioners is the grounding of AI ethics on a set of 
ethical rules exogenous to AI technology.  Broader adoption of AI ethics would be expected with an 
aggressive agenda for AI technology from the inside that adequately addresses ethical concerns.   
This paper argues that Bayesian machine learning, a rapidly developing approach to AI, provides this 
ethical direction for AI from the inside.  Whereas classical machine learning, the workhorse of most AI 
applications, calculates the probability of data given a single model, Bayesian machine learning 
calculates the uncertainty of various models given a set of data.  By combining human expertise, 
previous studies from related domains and data from the given domain, Bayesian machine learning is far 
more flexible than classical machine learning which defines human expertise, experience and 
uncertainty out of the problem domain. 
Classical and Bayesian machine learning thus approach the world in fundamentally different ways.  
Classical machine learning is premised on all causal features of a domain being knowable to the senses, 
quantifiable and computationally tractable, while Bayesian machine learning is premised on the real 
world as infinitely complex.  In turn, classical machine learning has an agenda that, in principle, leads to 
complete autonomy of AI applications, including robots.   
The message of AI ethicists to practitioners should be that classical AI is not merely ungrounded from an 
ethical perspective, it is also limited in its potential on AI’s own terms.  Because the world is infinitely 
complex, the most powerful AI incorporates as much of this complexity as possible through Bayesian 
methods that require a symbiosis between man and machine. 
Bayesian machine learning is reminiscent of Aristotelian deliberative reasoning which grounded ethics 
and technology for most of the history of technology.  Prior to the 20th century, technology was not 
conceived as applied science, but as a craft distinct from the sciences.  Technology advanced through 
trial and error, a process that integrated human judgment and science strikingly similar to Bayesian 
machine learning.  The classical presentation of this process is found in Aristotle’s Ethics, where techne 
and phronesis are two modes of deliberative reason (reasoning in the face of uncertainty) distinguished 
according to the activities with which they are concerned – production and action.  Phronesis is what is 
most commonly associated with ethical reasoning, and Aristotle presents phronesis as a higher form of 
techne, different in degree but not in kind.  
This was the basis for ethics and technology until the late 19th century, when technology was 
reconceived as applied science, and no room for uncertainty or human judgment was permitted for 
technical advance.  This led to the current predicament of autonomy associated with AI, and the ethical 
concerns raised by this autonomy.  A return to the classical basis of technology, which grounds an 
appeal to simply do better technology by accounting for uncertainty, can provide ethical grounding to 
modern technology.  Bayesian machine learning provides this appeal, and should be central to ethics 
and AI. 
I-B1
Engineering Ethics for Normative Design 
Pieter Vermaas 
Philosophy, Delft University of Technology 
p.e.vermaas@tudelft.nl 
a proposal for fPET 2018, track 2: Ethics relating to engineering and technology 
In this contribution I argue that engineering ethics leads to the obligation to designers to be 
transparent to stakeholders about the values they aim to realise in normative design 
approaches such as value-sensitive design, design for values, social design and nudging.  
This argument is motivated by two observations. The first is that the ethical obligations of 
designers working within social design (e.g., Marzano 2007) and nudging by the design of 
choice architecture (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) seem less articulated than the obligations of 
engineering design as captured by engineering ethics. Secondly the distinction between 
engineering design and these normative design approaches seem to be fading by the 
emergence of value-sensitive design (Friedman et al. 2006) and design for values (Van den 
Hoven et al. 2015). By this emergence engineering design cannot be understood anymore as 
merely the meeting of technical and function requirements in technical artefacts but becomes 
also the realisation of values of consumers and society in products, services and technologies. 
This fading of the distinction now given the opportunity to broaden engineering ethics to 
normative design approaches, and thus arrive at well-developed moral obligations to 
designers within value-sensitive design, design for values, social design and nudging. 
In the argument I first take three elements from engineering ethics: engineering codes of 
conduct, the obligation to acquire informed consent with stakeholders, and the obligation to 
take responsibility. Second I apply these elements to the mentioned normative design 
approaches. Third I shown that each of these elements requires designers to be transparent to 
stakeholders about the values they aim to realise in products, services and technologies. I 
furthermore discuss two counterarguments. The first is that informing stakeholders about the 
values to be realised may hamper the effectiveness of normative design. The second 
counterargument is that engineering ethics does not apply to social design and nudging. I 
agree that adding transparency as an extra value requirement may make value-sensitive 
design, design for values, social design and nudging more challenging, yet not impossible. 
And I observe that even if one rejects engineering ethics as applicable to such normative 
design approaches, proponents still accept transparency as an obligation (e.g., Sunstein 2015). 
References 
Friedman, B., Kahn, P. H. Jr., and Borning, A. (2006). Value sensitive design and information 
systems. In P. Zhang & D. Galletta (Eds.), Human-Computer Interaction in Management 
Information Systems: Foundations (pp. 348–372). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
Marzano, S. (2007) Flying over Las Vegas. Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV. 
Sunstein, C. R. (2015). The Ethics of Nudging. Yale Journal on Regulation, 32, 413–450. 
Thaler, R. H., and Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, 
and Happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Van den Hoven, J., Vermaas, P. E., and Van de Poel, I. (Eds.). (2015). Handbook of Ethics, 
Values and Technological Design. Dordrecht: Springer. 
I-B2
How to integrate public participation in engineering? 
—a study with the morphological approach 
Ximeng Chen, Wim Ravesteijn 
Zhejiang University 
Delft University of Technology 
Email 1223151906@qq.com 
Abstract China is undergoing a fast process of economic and technological growth. This results in 
environmental concerns and social frictions.Therefore, there is a need for a broad approach in 
engineering, in which these issues are incorporated right from the start and in the whole process 
of design, planning, construction and operation.In its growth, China aims to increase its trade 
with the surrounding world, especially in the One Belt, One road project .China also aspires to be 
an example for other developing and developed countries, especially now under Trump. So it 
needs a socio-technical approach that 1. supports its development at home and 2. helps to 
develop other countries, for example the ones involved in the One Belt, One Road project. The 
“morphological method”, as explained in this presentation, could give shape and contents to this 
required socio-technical approach. Lot of engineering projects having led to the unrest, 
dissatisfaction, discontents and demonstrations etc. In the west, the public participation in 
engineering practices has been successfully achieved , is that also good for China? what is public 
participation?( methods, problems, solutions ), What is the stages for public participation in 
China?( forms, problems) . Actually, the problems in China not solved by more communication 
cases as in the west, because China has its unique socio-political context , so it requires new 
approaches. One candidate can be the morphology method. what is the morphology method ? 
How to apply it ? We take the Xiamen-Gulei PX as an example to explain how this method works 
and what we can learn from the example . And then it comes out the conclusions 1: The method 
is workable in China, although in theory, it can solves present problems 2: Morphological method 
needs refinement. Disorder is not good, we want order (normative judgement). Thus, we need 
the morphology method. It can be applied when dealing with problems in the engineering 
practice, especially in the process of embedding technology in society—such as how to 
communicate between different parties, how to build a balanced system, and how to achieve 
effective dialogue in the stages of decision-making and planning of engineering works with public 
engagement. This paper explains this by developing a framework for public participation from a 
morphological perspective, which might overcome the communication problems that usually 
emerge in the involvement of the public in engineering . The Xiamen / Gulei Port PX case will be 
used as a case. 
Keywords Morphological method, Public participation, Xiamen-Gulei Port 
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Competition and the Creation of Neuroimaging: The History of Positron Emission 
Tomography 1976-1985 
Competition is one of the fundamental elements of scientific development. But how does 
competition shape scientific development? Few philosophers attempt to give an answer. 
Lakatos, for example, endorses a “winner-takes-all” account, according to which, the 
winner is better than the loser according to all or most of the relevant evaluative criteria 
and replaces the loser (Lakatos 1970). 
The history of neuroimaging defies such a “winner-takes-all” account. In 1974, researchers 
at Washington University in St. Louis created a prototype of a new medical imaging device 
called the Positron Emission Transaxial Tomograph (PETT) scanner. By 1977, fewer than 
20 articles a year were published about research that used the most advanced PETT 
scanner. Many researchers wondered whether the marginal increase in precision or 
accuracy over competitors could justify the million-dollar price tag (Keyes et al. 1977). To 
promote the PETT scanner, researchers radically redesigned the scanner and focused on a 
virtue neglected by the medical imaging community: speed. In 1978, they made the PETT 
scanner the only device fast enough to image biological processes in the brain in vivo (Ter-
Pogossian 1981). They further prepared new questions about cognitive functions, and 
came up with standardized methods and procedures to use the PETT scanner to answer 
those questions. In two years, the number of journal articles that included research using 
the PETT scanner took off – first hundreds and then thousands per year, creating a new 
field now known as neuroimaging. 
While it is true that fierce competition sometimes leads one research program to blot 
another out, the creation of neuroimaging demonstrates that sometimes fierce competition 
can change the competitive landscape, modify or even create evaluative criteria, and 
sometimes completely rewrite the rules of the game. In the case of neuroimaging, 
competition created an entirely new field with its own rules and virtues. 
The creation of neuroimaging further challenges the following philosophical positions. 
First, no universal or historically stable list of scientific virtues exists. Competition can 
create new virtues. Second, scientific and pragmatic virtues are deeply intertwined in the 
history and our evaluation of scientific development. Third, because the rules of the game 
change constantly, we can only assess local, but not general progress in scientific 
development. 
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The regulation of a genetically engineered mosquito as a pesticide: 
A case study 
by 
Zahra Meghani 
Genetically engineered (GE) organisms meant for release in the ‘wild’ present a challenge for regulatory 
agencies functioning under the auspices of biotechnology regulatory policy frameworks that pre-date the 
development of such entities and which did not anticipate their ‘creation’. This presentation will discusses 
some of the problems with regulatory agencies attempting to regulate GE organisms using a 
categorization schema that fails to recognize them as living entities. To that end, the efforts by US 
regulatory agencies to regulate a GE mosquito intended to suppress the population of its wildtype 
(presumably, resulting in a lower incidence of the transmission of the Zika virus and dengue to humans) 
will be used as a case study. The GE insect was initially classified as a new animal drug that fell under the 
regulatory jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In October 2017, the FDA ceded 
regulatory authority over the GE mosquito to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the grounds 
that the GE insect was a pesticide (US FDA 2017). 
The GE mosquito in questions is a genetically modified Aedes aegypti mosquito, with a heritable 
synthetic genetic sequence that results in tetracycline dependency. That dependency causing trait, in 
effect, amounts to a lethality gene; the vast majority of such insects cannot survive outside of laboratories 
unless they have access to tetracycline (Oxitec 2002-18). The intent is to release sufficient numbers of 
male GE mosquitoes such that they will outcompete their male wild-type counterpart to mate with their 
female wild-type, resulting in offspring who will inherit the tetracycline dependency trait. It is expected 
that the larvae will not survive to adulthood because, presumably, adequate amount of tetracycline will 
not be present in the regions where the GE mosquitoes are released. As a result, the population of Aedes 
aegypti in the target area will decline, presumably, resulting in lower incidence of transmission of Zika 
and dengue in humans (infected female Aedes aegypti transmit those viruses to humans).  
Given that the GE mosquito is a living animal, the decision to construe the GE insect for regulatory 
purposes as pesticide raises the following question: Will the GE mosquito be appropriately regulated? 
To engage with that question, this presentation will do the following: 
i. Consider the question what it means to regulate a living organism. 
ii. Identify and evaluate the normative concerns shaping the decision to classify the GE Aedes
aegypti mosquito as a pesticide for regulatory purposes.
iii. Examine the significance of the regulatory categorization of a living organism as a pesticide and
consider alternative classification possibilities.
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Engineering Ethics without Engineers? How Western Philosophy Might Learn from 
Engineering Ethics in Taiwan 
Author: Bono Po-Jen Shih 
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cheng 
Abstract: 
This paper engages with a dominant thought more or less explicit in Western 
engineering ethics that “without engineers making decisions, there can be no 
engineering ethics.” (Davis, 2007) The study seeks to contextualize contemporary 
engineering ethics and education in Taiwan and explains and defends the phenomenon 
when discussion of engineering ethics sometimes goes without engineers playing a key 
role or making decisions. 
First and foremost among the issues is a linguistic philosophical perspective necessary to 
understand engineering in the Chinese language, or gong cheng, as a polysemous word 
including meanings of scheduled tasks, buildings, public works, and a credential-based 
profession responsible for designing, manufacturing and maintaining modern 
technologies. In this sense, engineering ethics is also ethics of technological activities 
and of technology. Responsibilities and commitments in engineering ethics not only 
applies to professional engineers, but can extend to all personnel involving in 
engineering work, sometimes without an engineer currently in charge of making 
decisions. 
In learning engineering ethics, non-engineer participants and technology are not only 
the context professional engineers need to learn about when they are making ethical 
decisions. They are also the subjects engineering ethics directly address. The inclination 
to include critical players who are not engineers per se in engineering ethics is reinforced 
by the socioeconomic context of Taiwan as a highly populated technological society with 
a legacy of less strict regulations and the rapid growth during the “Taiwan Miracle.” 
Even though engineering ethics and education practice in Taiwan sometimes fail to 
delineate proper responsibilities of professional engineers, the eclectic approach to 
including non-engineers and technology as the scope of engineering ethics has several 
advantages to offer. In ethics theory and teaching, it helps bridge microethics and 
macroethics that are often separate in Western engineering ethics discussion. In practice, 
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it also transforms individual responsibilities into collective awareness and sustained 
support for ethical decisions and precaution principles in engineering that are so needed 
in a technological society like Taiwan. 
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Abstract 
Clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) genome editing has 
already reinvented the direction of genetic and stem cell research. CRISPR  is already beginning 
to change the nature of how medical research and medicine is being practiced while also raising 
a variety of ethical issues. The nature of CRISPR gene editing technology is changing as rapidly 
as it can be developed. Biomedical engineering (BME) is the application of engineering 
principles and design concepts to medicine and biology for healthcare purposes (e.g. diagnostic 
or therapeutic). This field seeks to close the gap between engineering and medicine, combining 
the design and problem solving skills of engineering with medical biological sciences to advance 
health care treatment, including diagnosis, monitoring, therapy, and enhancement.From the 
perspective of medical research and the practice of medicine, CRISPR replaces earlier methods 
of gene editing and needs to be combined with (BME). For more complex diseases it allows 
scientists to simultaneously create multiple genetic changes to a single cell. Technologies for 
correcting multiple mutations in an in vivo system are already in development. On the surface, 
the advent and use of gene editing technologies is a powerful tool to reduce human suffering by 
eradicating complex disease that has a genetic etiology. Gene drives are CRISPR mediated 
alterations to genes that allow them to be passed on to subsequent populations at rates that 
approach 100% transmission. Therefore, from an anticipatory biomedical ethics perspective, it is 
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possible to conceive gene drive being used with CRISPR to permanently ameliorate aberrant 
genes from wild-type populations containing mutations.  
However, there are also a number of possible side effects that could develop as the result of 
combining gene editing and gene drive technologies in an effort to eradicate complex diseases.  
In this paper, we critically analyze the hypothesis that the combination of CRISPR and gene 
drive will have a deleterious effect on human populations from an ethical perspective by 
developing an anticipatory ethical analysis of the implications for the use of CRISPR together 
with gene drive in humans.  
Could CRISPR and gene drive technologies affect human populations? We believe that 
anticipatory ethics can be used to attempt to address the ethical issues raised by asking this 
question. Anticipatory ethics is concerned with examining potential ethical problems with 
emerging technology while this technology is still in the early stages of development. Ethical 
issues are identified at the research and development stage of technological progress and are 
explored as possibilities experienced by potential stakeholders. Both CRISPR and gene drives 
are technologies that are in the early phases of development and implementation and as such, 
they are ripe for an anticipatory ethical analysis and suggested courses of action for policy 
makers.  
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Title: Intuiting Safe Design: Strengthening Design-for-Values Frameworks 
Abstract: 
This paper argues that although moral intuitions are insufficient for making judgments on new 
technological innovations, they maintain great utility for informing responsible innovation. The 
Value Sensitive Design (VSD) methodology is adopted as an illustrative example of how stakeholder 
values can be better distilled to inform responsible innovation. It is also argued that moral intuitions 
are necessary for determining stakeholder values required for the design of responsible technologies. 
This argument is supported by the claim that the moral intuitions of stakeholders allow designers to 
conceptualize stakeholder values and incorporate them into the early phases of design. It is concluded 
that design-for-values (DFV) frameworks like the VSD methodology can remain potent if developers 
adopt heuristic tools to diminish the influence of cognitive biases thus strengthening the reliability of 
moral intuitions. 
Keywords: 
design methodology; moral epistemology; design psychology; innovation; value 
sensitive design 
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Briefing on Ethics Research 
 (a)  Self-Driving Cars or Self-Inflicted Scars: Edward Birrane, Cameron Blomquist, Sarah 
Heiner, Caroline Kery, Rushmie Kulkarni and Samantha Turskey 
 Self-driving cars are no longer an idea of the future. Automotive manufacturers have endorsed 
the concept of driverless technologies as evidenced by their funding of research and development 
in this domain. Social acceptance of driverless automobiles is perceived as a natural extension of 
the acceptance of technology and automation in others aspects of daily living. As governments 
seek to understand the liability and regulation implications of allowing these vehicles on public 
roads, a common consideration is how to evaluate the overall public good. We claim this is a 
complex consideration and demonstrate this complexity with a narrative describing a 
consequence of driverless automobiles. Based on that narrative we formulate a moral problem 
statement representative of this technology in general and conduct a formal ethical analysis of 
that problem. From this analysis, we conclude that as a society-impacting technology, self-
driving cars must be constrained by a set of ethical requirements. Finally, we propose a set of 
such requirements that should be considered prior to allowing the deployment of these vehicles 
in public spaces. 
(b) Ethical Requirements for Cryptocurrencies: Edward Birrane, Hemang Bhatt, Travis Early, 
Hannah Kiesel, Sumanth Neerumalla, David Reichard and Haley Sprehe 
Cryptocurrencies offer peer-to-peer monetary transactions through decentralized systems. They 
are becoming popular alternatives to traditional financial systems based on the perception that 
they are more secure, incur fewer transaction fees, enable global access, and require fewer 
dependencies on third parties – including government institutions. This paper addresses the 
ethical motivations driving the creation and maintenance of cryptocurrencies as a domain. We 
investigate the concept that the design, implementation, and adoption of a cryptocurrency is 
burdened by the morality of its developers and that this morality must be understood to make 
correct ethical decisions related to this technology. To support this analysis, we define 
“Hailstorm Coin” a hypothetical representation of a cryptocurrency system with features found 
in current and likely near-future cryptocurrencies. Using Hailstorm Coin, we conduct a formal 
ethical analysis of the decisions relating to its development and maintenance and provide an 
example narrative associated with the consequences of ignoring ethical requirements as part of 
technology design. We conclude that while safety, privacy, and transparency are motivating 
ideas for end users, they can only exist if levied as ethical requirements on the design, 
implementation, and maintenance of the cryptocurrency itself.  
(c) Genomic Vaccines: An Ethical Analysis: Edward Birrane, Aditya Kaliappan, Jonathan 
Ventura, Mitchell Yum, Nadezhda Bzhilyanskaya and Ujjwal Rehani 
Genomic vaccines represent a potentially beneficial example of how technological advancements 
enable and accelerate bioengineering. As these vaccines become viable defenses against a 
plethora of diseases, focus must shift from their technological development to their ethical 
application. This paper analyzes several anticipated benefits of genomic vaccines to understand 
whether they are unique to this technology, whether they are actually benefits, and whether their 
I-D3
Three papers by UMBC Engineering Ethics Students and Dr. Birrane
disposition is based on an accurate concept of the technical limitations of these vaccines. We 
illustrate the potential for misunderstanding the benefits of this technology with a hypothetical 
narrative describing how severe consequences may occur if proper precautions are not taken 
during the life cycle of the vaccine. In the context of this narrative, we identify a motivating 
moral problem with genomic vaccines and perform a formal ethical analysis of potential actions 
to take when faced with this problem. Our analysis highlights ethical ideals, stakeholders and 
known unknowns and strategies to tackle the problem. Furthermore, an evaluation and reflection 
of the moral problem using intuition and the ethical theories of Utilitarianism, Kantianism, and 
Virtue ethics will be conducted. Finally, there will be a brief discussion of further explorations 
that can be conducted to tackle known unknowns, with a final position on the technological area 
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When is the Past Reality? 
Stanley C. Kranc 
Windows provide visual access to the world beyond physical walls that block our 
view. But what if the scene we see via the window is not the “right now” present; instead 
the view occurred five years ago? Or was a scene from somewhere else? These 
thoughts form the basis of Bob Shaw’s much-anthologized short story, “Light of Other 
Days”, where “slow glass” refers to a transparent solid that retards light transmission. 
Consumers purchase “scenedows”—panels previously exposed to various 
landscapes—to decorate their homes. But what does it mean to see the past? And 
where exactly is the space beheld?  Does the scenedow provide access to perceptible 
reality or simply a new species of depictive image?  
This paper suggests that Shaw’s science fiction lies at the intersection of techno-
science and the philosophy of perception. Slow glass is not such an bizarre idea; 
perhaps some substance like this might be developed in the future. The concept 
however, raises significant concerns regarding physics: would light passing through a 
thick panel be differentially retarded, depending on the original angle of incidence? If so, 
the resultant parallax effect would be inconsistent for the viewer. A related philosophical 
concern is the time-lag argument, sometimes offered against direct realism: the finite 
speed of light means that we never visually perceive anything as in the present. Since 
slow glass panels can also be relocated, the viewer’s access to veridical egocentric 
spatial and temporal information is called into question. 
In his nonfiction book, How to Write Science Fiction, Shaw discusses how he 
constructed the original story. He claims that, as author, he need not understand the 
physical principles underlying the science he proposes, and neither do his characters. 
He did however continue to explore the concept and eventually released Other Days, 
Other Eyes, a prequel-sequel volume centered on the life and work of the 
engineer/chemist who invented slow glass. Here, Shaw attempted to work around some 
of the physical complexities associated with this substance, while presenting several 
possible applications. In doing so, he introduced an ethical dimension to his speculative 
technological advances, exploring various consequences for individuals and 
corresponding societal repercussions. In particular, he examines potential criminal uses 
for slow glass contrasted with beneficial aspects of retained evidence. Most importantly, 
Shaw projects that slow glass could ultimately become a weapon of political oppression. 
Small particles of the glass dispersed by the government as a means of surveillance 
would result in the total and irreversible loss of personal privacy. Thus, the “story” of 
slow glass reads as a cautionary myth: a nascent technology beginning with a 
discovery/invention followed by a cycle of engineering development, resulting in 
unanticipated consequences, requiring engineering remedies, yielding more 
applications and subsequent complications. Along the way, the public comes to reject 
the technology and distrust the engineer who develops it. Taken together, Shaw’s three 
works offer a unique opportunity to examine the relationship of speculative fiction has 
with the course of engineering development and the philosophy of technology, as 
influences on both author and reader. 
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Revisiting Hegel’s traces: shifts of determinacy in the course of the digital transformation 
In the discussion about ubiquitous technology after the turn of the millennium, German 
philosopher Christoph Hubig raised concerns about the fact that the usage of technical devices 
would not produce any recognizable traces any more. This would put an end to the dialectic 
process described by Hegel in the reflection of means and ends. Multiple layers of technology 
which are nowadays involved in any instrumental action do not leave much to learn from the 
comparison of intended outcomes and actual outcomes of an action. Actors fail to understand 
how their mode of using a device for a certain purpose contributes to the effect of this usage. As 
a consequence, it becomes unclear how reason should be applied. 
After another decade of progress with the digital transformation, such concerns can be 
discussed from a new perspective. Current approaches in the field of innovation management and 
systems engineering show how device usage does not only stop creating traces, but also how 
users themselves are made increasingly traceable at the same time. Decreasing determinacy on 
the side of the device goes along with increasing determinacy on the side of the user. In order to 
provide more customized and efficient services to their users, technical devices process more 
information about users, and the continuous accumulation of data necessary to provide this 
information has lately become one of the major drivers for technical development. 
This development seems to confirm critical views of the progress of enlightenment as 
they were expressed earlier by Heidegger, Adorno, Horkheimer, Gehlen and others. In many 
respects, a direct line can be drawn from early modern political philosophy to current attempts of 
“user integration” in technology, which may explain why this development is perceived 
positively, fostering visions of participation and democracy. For the same reason, it is 
understandable that problems appear in particular when it comes to matters of privacy. The user 
as a participant in technical systems is a political actor; (s)he plays a public role, which requires 
consistency and reliability in the interaction with others. The private person remains in a sphere 
in which traces are preliminary and may change over time. The problem is the transition from the 
private person to the public role, and the effort to maintain the consistency that is necessary to 
fulfil this role, or, in other words, provide the ground for traces. 
All this points towards the need for a research agenda in the philosophy of engineering 
and technology which focusses on the creation of determinacy in technological systems. Prior 
research has looked at the way how determinacy is created in engineering with respect to 
physical objects and formal-symbolic expressions. Today, the same mechanisms might have to 
be applied to the way how political actors are engineered in there public roles. Furthermore, it 
will be important to understand the ephemeral nature of these creations and their continuous re-
negotiation in the course of technical design, like a dance in which music is constantly re-
interpreted in new ways. 
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Title: Expertise and Participatory Technology Assessment: Going Beyond Laboratory Studies to 
Understand the Expert/Lay Divide 
Authors: David Tomblin, Jen Schneider, and Mahmud Farooque 
How engineers should relate to democracy is a topic of ongoing academic and policy interest. President 
Obama’s Open Government Initiative primed technical experts from several agencies to experiment with 
participatory technology assessment (pTA), a deliberative method for eliciting lay citizen input prior to 
making policy decisions (Sclove, 2010). Technical expert involvement with pTA opened up an 
opportunity to expand on what we understand as expertise, which traditionally has been defined through 
observations derived from laboratory studies (e.g., Collins, 1985; Latour, 1987). One of the major 
findings from this foundational research that is relevant to our study is the deconstruction of the fact/value 
dichotomy – the notion that experts can generate knowledge that is divorced from socio-political 
circumstance – and the related maintenance of the expert/lay divide. Expert involvement in pTA design 
and implementation is an interesting place to study the expert/lay divide because experts are directly 
confronted with the value-laden nature of knowledge production, bringing into tension the exclusionary 
authority of expertise on the one hand and the inclusive nature of democracy on the other (Turner, 2014; 
Durrant, 2011; Grundmann, 2017).  
This study seeks to explore the value of pTA as a boundary object that challenges the linear model of 
knowledge production and expertise. We define a boundary object here as an assemblage of instruments, 
activities, and procedures where multiple epistemic cultures can come together and maintain their unique 
identities, negotiate existing and evolving institutional narratives, while still being able to exchange ideas 
(Star and Griesemer, 1989). We use three cases of government agencies adopting pTA in partnership with 
a boundary organization, Experts and Citizens Assessment of Science and Technology (ECAST), to 
explore how existing and evolving institutional narratives influence expert interactions with pTA 
development and implementation. Each agency’s narrative associated with adopting pTA represents a 
particular technocratic story that implicitly laments upholding the expert/lay citizen divide while 
simultaneously performing boundary work to protect the legitimacy and authority of expertise (Gieryn, 
1999). NASA saw pTA as a way of broadening its relevance to the public and increasing its portfolio of 
initiatives to democratize missions. The Department of Energy adopted pTA in the aftermath of 30 years 
of failing to site a permanent nuclear waste repository (Yucca Mountain) through top-down, technocratic 
approaches. NOAA found the science-centered model of education ineffective at convincing large 
segments of the U.S. population (including decision-makers) of the importance of addressing climate 
change and sought pTA as a process for transitioning to user-centered science.  
This study builds off previous work that uses boundary metaphors to understand expertise in the policy 
arena (Hoppe et al., 2013) and presents a theoretical framework for challenging standard presentations of 
the expert/lay divide and understanding the multiple ways that experts negotiate procedures and outcomes 
of pTA in different organizational contexts.  
Key Words: Participatory technology assessment, boundary object, boundary work, technocratic, 
expertise, NASA, Department of Energy, NOAA, democratization of science and technology 
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Ethics in Citizen Science: Lessons from the Flint, MI Water Crisis 
The citizen science collaboration between Flint residents and the Virginia Tech “Flint Water 
Study” team helped uncover the Flint Water Crisis and a Legionella outbreak in large buildings. 
Those scientific findings, contributed to a Federal Emergency declaration in January 2016, 
hundreds of millions of dollars in relief, an internationally acknowledged case of environmental 
injustice, and resignations or criminal indictments for some responsible public officials. 
Following this triumph, when the responsible government agencies rededicated themselves to 
making amends and helping Flint recover, citizen scientists dealt with biases and conflicts of 
interest that are well-known to conventional scientists. Examples of concern included 1) 
collection of non-representative data and public health messaging, that interfered with official 
messages and created unnecessary fear amongst residents about the safety of water used for 
bathing and showering, 2) undisclosed financial conflicts of interest by citizen “scientists” 
coordinating collection and interpretation of data, and 3) misrepresentation or falsification of 
data to garner relief resources, support possible litigation or prove unconventional hypotheses. 
The results highlight the importance of quality control safeguards in citizen science, which are 
especially relevant in the midst of a crisis given the lack of peer review in publicly shared data, 
presumed altruistic motives of participants, and difficulties of media outlets to differentiate good 
science from bad. A code of ethics for citizen scientists may be helpful in revealing financial 
conflicts of interest, mitigating pressures that could cause confirmation bias in participants, and 
managing expectations for “citizen science” projects. 
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Why engineers must be more than problem solvers. 
Thomas SIller, Gearold Johnson, and Russell Korte 
Karl Popper once gave a talk titled “All Life is Problem Solving” which is now published in a 
book of the same title [1]. His focus included the need for humanity to be entrepreneurs in 
addressing new challenges. This phrase of being problem solvers has become a common rhetoric 
when defining the engineering profession. This has become so common that it has become a 
normative ontology for engineers. It is our intent to dispute this view that engineers are 
normatively problem solvers. We do agree that much of what engineers do can be considered 
problem solving but it is an insufficient characterization of the profession. Stated quite simply, if 
engineers solved problems they would go away but clearly the areas engineering addresses 
continue to be issues for humanity. But let’s be clear, engineers do solve problems. To clarify 
our position requires that we look carefully at the level of problem definition to understand 
where problems are solved or not solved. In previous work [2], we described problem definition 
as ranging from being local to regional to eventually at a global scale. At the same time, we drew 
parallels between this scale and one that characterizes engineers as working as specialists (local) 
to the more global interdisciplinary engineers. Our original model focused on the problem 
definition component, we now want to explore the importance of the ontological view of 
engineers as problem solvers and its implication for interdisciplinary work. 
Interdisciplinary efforts have become more important as the challenges to humanity, e.g. 
climate change, poverty, etc. have become so complex. Calls for disciplines to work together to 
‘solve’ these problems are common. This leads naturally to how do we get disciplines working 
together -and of particular interest to us is how to train future engineers to work with other 
disciplines. Lately we have been encouraged by an approach in the health care professional 
training known as Interprofessional Education (IPE). This approach brings future professionals 
together during the education stage to learn from, about, and with each other. Others have 
focused on the need to develop better communication between the disciplines, often by 
developing common terminology that can bridge the gap between disciplines. Our goal is to now 
add ontological views as another aspect needed to be explored if disciplines are to be successful 
working with each other. It appears that today the need to understand the philosophical views of 
different disciplines plays an important role in encouraging interdisciplinary efforts. This is 
where we believe this view that engineers are problem solvers is important to explore. Other 
disciplines that engineering needs to interact with, especially social sciences, do not share this 
view that all problems can be solved. We have advocated that a view that problems need to be 
managed rather than solved would result in closer alignment with other disciplines. By better 
understanding different disciplines’ philosophies a basis for working together can be created. 
1. Popper, K.R., All life is problem solving. 1999, London; New York: Routledge. xii,171 p.
2. Siller, T.J. and G.R. Johnson. Engineering on the Boundaries. in World Engineering
Convention. 2011. Geneva, Switzerland: World Federation of Engineering Organizations. 
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The Middle Way Evolution of Engineering Design 
Professor Terry Bristol 
Portland State University 
Institute for Science, Engineering and Public Policy 
Vincenti argues that engineering is not simply applied science. Engineering design of 
artifacts and systems, does not result from the mere applications of scientific knowledge. 
“Scientific knowledge is a wonderful tool. But it doesn’t tell you how to build an 
airplane.” 
Bucciarelli applied Wittgenstein’s approach to explore the engineering design process. 
“Structural engineers speaks of stress and strain; of displacement, stiffness, and load path. 
Electronics engineer speaks of power, voltages and currents, analogue and digital, 
resistance and capacitance. Their languages and objet worlds are incommensurable. They 
lack a common, objective language. How do they communicate? This is an unresolvable 
problem. How then to make sense of the successful design of an electro-mechanical 
artifact or system? How to make sense of the outcome, of the technological reality? 
I point out that these languages and object worlds are formally complementary. Modern 
quantum theory tells us that particle mechanics and wave mechanics are complementary. 
The languages and the object worlds of these two mechanics, as well as the engineering 
disciplines that rly on them are also complementary. There are no common conceptual or 
operational denominators. 
When mechanical and electrical engineers manage to work together to create novel 
electro-mechanical artifacts and systems it cannot have been through any sort of simple 
applied science design strategy.  Besides their design process being mysterious, we will 
be unable to make sense of the resulting technology in terms of either the mechanical or 
electrical languages alone.  
The successful engineering design process as well as the ontology of engineering reality 
cannot be reduced to, cannot be understood in terms of idealized scientific realities. 
By extending Bucciarelli’s arguments with reference to complementarity we see that the 
successful design process (viz. itself a technique) advances by the ‘middle way’ – 
between the idealized, scientific, mechanical extremes. The products, the technological 
artifacts and technological systems, necessarily embody complementary features and can 
be characterized as ‘middle ground’ realities. 
Complementarity is ubiquitous and is involved in all successful design – from the design 
of the irrigation of our fields, the design of our houses, our cities, the design of our 
businesses and economic policies and to the design of our political and moral system.  
Human socio-economic systems are technological systems. The imagined structure and 
function of free market individualism and socialism suggest two complementary design 
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ideologies. Oakeshott observes that all real societies embody both individualist and 
socialist structures and functions. Haidt captures the ‘essential tension’ in real societies 
and the expected ‘talking passed each other’.  
Bohr clearly recognized the connection between quantum theory and the structure and 
function of reality. The central image on his coat of arms is the Taoist yin-yang diagram. 
Dawkins and Falkowski have explored the question of the design and the evolution of the 
design of the biosphere.  
Gallie characterized the socio-economic design dialogue as involving ‘essentially 
contested concepts’– such as justice and fairness? Connolly commented that once the 
design participants realized that they were dealing with essentially contested concepts 
“enlightened dialogue could begin”. 
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7. Haidt, Jon, (2012), The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics
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Princeton University Press; and Dawkins, Richard, (2016), The Selfish Gene (40th 
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Integrating ethics into the Grand Challenges 
The “new engineering education paradigm” of the Grand Challenges emphasizes five 
competencies engineers need to address such “societal problems” as providing fresh water and 
inexpensive power for all. These goals are ethical, but the new paradigm fails to emphasize the 
skills required to achieve them and, in particular, achieve them ethically. 
We have designed an introductory course on Fresh Water, that emphasizes those skills and others 
that are essential — critical thinking, creative problem-solving, working in teams, making clear 
presentations, reading and summarizing complex articles from a variety of disciplines, 
recognizing and resolving ethical issues that permeate engineering practice, learning how to do 
research, and ensuring that solutions be economically viable. 
Students are immediately immersed in problem-solving. Each must find a problem regarding 
fresh water they want to investigate and then sell it to the class in a brief presentation explaining 
its importance. Five or six winners are chosen by ballot. Each student selects a winner and then 
works in teams of four or five to solve the team’s problem. The end product is a poster the teams 
present — stating the problem (using the assertion evidence approach), the current condition 
(benchmarking other solutions), a root cause analysis, the goal, an implementation plan (showing 
a business plan), and a follow-up for problems that may arise. 
Meanwhile they are reading articles from various disciplines regarding fresh water and writing 
one-page micro-essays on each, stating the thesis and the arguments for it. These are graded on 
how well they understood the article. We then discuss the issues raised by the article for that 
week. For instance, how should we distribute Colorado River water? Is water a commodity? A 
common good? How can we distribute too little to too many and yet be fair and avoid the tragedy 
of the commons? As this example shows, we emphasize ethical aspects of the cases we read 
about, and each team is required to do an ethical assessment of the solution it offers: how well 
does it address the problem chosen? Why is it better than other possible solutions? What are the 
downsides? Can they be mitigated? 
We — an engineer and a philosopher — rarely lecture, but are there to help the teams when they 
need guidance and to lead discussions on the wide variety of topics the essays raise. The student 
evaluations are universally positive — no doubt because all their other introductory classes are 
lectures, and in this one, as one student put it, probably not recognizing the irony, “It’s the first 
class I’ve ever had where I got to teach myself!” 
The question we pose is whether engineers agree in the assessment our students give the course. 
After providing further details, we will solicit critical and helpful comments to see if this course 
can serve as a model for other introductory courses in the Grand Challenges. 
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Teaching Engineering Ethics in the Chinese Context: Understanding Instructor Perceptions of 
Engineering Ethics Education at Chinese Engineering Universities 
Hengli Zhang, Beijing University of Technology, China 
Qin Zhu, Colorado School of Mines, USA 
In the past decade, governmental agencies, universities and programs, policymakers, and 
educators in China have been striving for reforming and “globalizing” the engineering ethics 
curriculum. The national call for transforming curriculum and instruction for engineering ethics 
has become more imperative than ever due to China’s recent campaigns for enhancing its global 
manufacturing competitiveness (e.g., the Made in China 2025 Initiative). Scholars have proposed 
various strategies for improving the teaching effectiveness of engineering ethics including by 
integrating “global forms” (e.g., case studies, ethical codes, applied ethics approach) into the 
Chinese context. Nevertheless, limited empirical research is available that examines the 
alignment of these strategies and the cultures of engineering education in China such as the 
instructor perceptions of engineering ethics education. We argue that understanding how Chinese 
instructors perceive engineering ethics instruction is crucial for better reflecting on the 
assumptions and limitations underlying current local practices, evaluating the feasibility of 
adopting global forms, and formulating teaching strategies sensitive to the Chinese context. In 
this study, we systematically reviewed the engineering ethics literature and teased out a list of 
most “contested” questions in engineering ethics education (e.g., who are qualified for teaching 
engineering ethics; whether ethical theories such as deontology, utilitarianism, virtue ethics 
should be taught). By using these questions as guideline, we conducted semi-structured 
interviews with 12 Chinese engineering ethics instructors trained in three different fields: STS 
(Science, Technology, and Society) and philosophy of science and technology engineering, and 
Marxist studies and ethical theories. We also compared our findings with how non-Chinese 
instructors responded to these questions in the literature. This paper is expected to shed light on 
the cultures of engineering ethics education in China and provide insights into formulating 
effective policies and teaching strategies conducive to the Chinese context. We also hope this 
paper can provide implications for graduate education research in the global context. For 
instance, this paper may help scholars better understand the previous ethics education experience 
of Chinese graduate students in STEM fields in American universities which has not been 
systematically studied in the STEM education literature, let alone foreign-born scientists’ and 
engineers’ data have not been captured as a separate category in many National Science 
Foundation (NSF) and other governmental agency reports in the United States.
Keywords: Instructor perceptions; Engineering ethics education; The Chinese context; Global 
engineering education; Cross-cultural comparison 
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The place of Philosophy in Engineering degree programs 
Dr. Andrés Santa-María 
Departamento de Estudios Humanísticos 
Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María (Chile) 
From the arising of ‘Philosophy of Engineering’ twelve years ago in the first meeting of 
philosophers and engineers at MIT in 2006 and the first Workshop on Philosophy and 
Engineering at Delf University of Technology (2007), a still downing but increasing 
awareness of its relevance as a philosophical discipline (with its own academic community 
and research agenda) has been taken by the academic world. It still remains to be seen what 
kind of impact it is going to have in the future of the Engineering practice. In order to reach 
such an impact, a special attention should be taken to the processes of initial training of 
prospective Engineers at the universities. In this paper I would like to focus on the place of 
the teaching of Philosophy in the context of Engineering degree programs, attempting to 
answer to three questions: (1) Is it really relevant to teach one or more philosophical subjects 
in the Engineering degree programs? (2) If it is relevant, should it play a supplementary or 
rather a fundamental role? And (3) if it plays a fundamental role, how it has to be taught in 
order to be perceived as such by the prospective Engineers? My proposal is that, given the 
very nature of Philosophy as a discipline that has to do with the fundamentals of being, 
knowledge and behavior, Philosophy of Engineering must be conceived at least as one of the 
subjects traditionally considered as ‘basics’ for an student of Engineering programs, like 
Mathematics and Physics. Indeed, the reflection on the epistemological and ethical basis of 
the Engineering practice should provide a more profound and a more articulated 
understanding of the traditional Engineering subjects (e.g. Mechanics of Fluids, Statistics, 
Robotics, etc.) rather than a mere – even if very interesting – complementary information. If 
the task of an Engineer is, in a way, to be able to generalize and apply the knowledge of 
various disciplines in order to diagnose and solve certain problems efficiently, it cannot be 
detached from a solid notion about human development, besides a solid notion on technical 
or economic development as well. And there are several reasons to think that a solid notion 
about human development should better come from a philosophical reflection on the ethical, 
political and epistemological implications of the Engineering practice. 
Key-words: Philosophy of Engineering, Engineering Education, Human development. 
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Engineering Ethics without Engineers? How Western Philosophy Might Learn from 
Engineering Ethics in Taiwan 
Author: Bono Po-Jen Shih 
Keyword: Engineering ethics, engineering education, linguistic philosophy, Taiwan, gong 
cheng 
Abstract: 
This paper engages with a dominant thought more or less explicit in Western 
engineering ethics that “without engineers making decisions, there can be no 
engineering ethics.” (Davis, 2007) The study seeks to contextualize contemporary 
engineering ethics and education in Taiwan and explains and defends the phenomenon 
when discussion of engineering ethics sometimes goes without engineers playing a key 
role or making decisions. 
First and foremost among the issues is a linguistic philosophical perspective necessary to 
understand engineering in the Chinese language, or gong cheng, as a polysemous word 
including meanings of scheduled tasks, buildings, public works, and a credential-based 
profession responsible for designing, manufacturing and maintaining modern 
technologies. In this sense, engineering ethics is also ethics of technological activities 
and of technology. Responsibilities and commitments in engineering ethics not only 
applies to professional engineers, but can extend to all personnel involving in 
engineering work, sometimes without an engineer currently in charge of making 
decisions. 
In learning engineering ethics, non-engineer participants and technology are not only 
the context professional engineers need to learn about when they are making ethical 
decisions. They are also the subjects engineering ethics directly address. The inclination 
to include critical players who are not engineers per se in engineering ethics is reinforced 
by the socioeconomic context of Taiwan as a highly populated technological society with 
a legacy of less strict regulations and the rapid growth during the “Taiwan Miracle.” 
Even though engineering ethics and education practice in Taiwan sometimes fail to 
delineate proper responsibilities of professional engineers, the eclectic approach to 
including non-engineers and technology as the scope of engineering ethics has several 
advantages to offer. In ethics theory and teaching, it helps bridge microethics and 
macroethics that are often separate in Western engineering ethics discussion. In practice, 
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it also transforms individual responsibilities into collective awareness and sustained 
support for ethical decisions and precaution principles in engineering that are so needed 
in a technological society like Taiwan. 
SESSION III 
Narrative knowing and engineering: a case from the intersection of biology and 
engineering 
Dominic J. Berry 
A recent special issue of ​Studies A ​(v. 62) has made the case for the fundamental narrative 
form of much scientific knowledge. My paper extends this programme into engineering, 
allowing us to make new contrasts and comparisons between the distinct professions, 
collections of disciplines, and epistemologies that make up the sciences and engineering. In 
particular I focus on the connections between narratives, epistemic goals, and collaboration. 
The intersection between biology and engineering is one that some key philosophers have 
already begun to develop systematically, most notably Bill WImsatt. Building on these 
foundations I bring to the surface the ways in which narrative has perhaps always been 
present in our accounts of engineering knowledge.  
My case is based on interviews and ethnographic observation that took place between 2015 
and 2017 with a research group composed of biologists and engineers. Their project is 
dedicated to understanding how seeds fly. We come to a deeper understanding of how such 
a collaboration is facilitated and made to cohere by greater attention to the narrative form in 
which knowledge is recorded and communicated. These are features of engineering work 
that are ripe for further exploration, allowing us also to further integrate philosophical, social 
scientific and historical work. With these purposes in mind, I end by extending the story 
historically, to consider the role of narrative in earlier biological engineering projects.  
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Epistemic	  Practices	  in	  Engineering
Epistemology	  in	  engineering	  helps	  us	  understand	  how	  engineers	  make	  choices.	  Their	  
epistemology	  provides	  the	  unspoken	  basis	  of	  what	  can	  be	  considered	  good	  practices	  in	  
their	  fields,	  and	  is	  therefore	  very	  important	  to	  understand.	  However,	  epistemology	  in	  
engineering	  is	  difficult	  to	  deal	  with	  due	  to	  its	  dialogical	  nature.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  
epistemologies	  of	  engineers	  are	  context-­‐bound	  and	  cultural	  has	  presented	  persistent	  
methodological	  challenges.	  To	  address	  these	  issues,	  we	  have	  developed	  a	  means	  of	  
investigating	  the	  epistemologies	  of	  engineers	  by	  using	  epistemic	  practices	  and	  dialogical	  
semi-­‐structured	  interviews.	  By	  utilizing	  this	  method	  of	  interviewing,	  we	  were	  able	  to	  
investigate	  the	  participant’s	  epistemic	  stances	  by	  contrasting	  alternative	  epistemological	  
conceptions.	  This	  allowed	  us	  to	  codify	  and	  more	  efficiently	  clarify	  the	  epistemic	  stances	  of	  
the	  interviewees	  than	  some	  traditional	  interviewing	  techniques.	  
Epistemic	  stances	  are	  how	  knowledge	  is	  used	  in	  a	  specific	  instance	  to	  inform	  the	  actions	  an	  
individual	  takes,	  why	  they	  made	  that	  decision,	  and	  what	  that	  decision	  means	  to	  them.	  The	  
way	  epistemic	  stances	  are	  connected	  by	  common	  themes,	  such	  as	  justifications,	  constitute	  
an	  epistemic	  practice.	  Epistemic	  practices	  in	  engineering	  examine	  an	  individual’s	  personal	  
understanding	  of	  what	  constitutes	  knowledge,	  and	  how	  knowing	  something	  works.	  
Questions	  such	  as	  what	  an	  engineer	  needs	  to	  know,	  how	  to	  teach	  them	  what	  they	  need	  to	  
know,	  and	  what	  characterizes	  engineering	  are	  of	  central	  importance	  to	  understanding	  the	  
epistemic	  practices	  that	  engineer’s	  hold.	  To	  investigate	  these	  questions	  we	  have	  developed	  
an	  interview	  protocol	  based	  on	  participants’	  own	  experiences	  in	  engineering,	  such	  as	  
describing	  a	  time	  another	  person	  was	  involved	  in	  their	  decision	  making	  process,	  and	  how	  
that	  person	  played	  a	  role	  in	  affecting	  their	  decisions.	  Using	  their	  responses,	  we	  developed	  
interview	  questions	  around	  the	  information	  they	  provided	  and	  interviewed	  a	  set	  of	  
professional	  engineers,	  engineering	  students,	  and	  engineering	  faculty.	  The	  transcriptions	  of	  
the	  interviews	  were	  audio-­‐recorded,	  transcribed,	  and	  analyzed	  using	  systemic	  functional	  
linguistics.	  This	  analysis	  connected	  epistemic	  stances	  via	  common	  themes	  to	  establish	  a	  set	  
of	  epistemic	  practices	  prevalent	  among	  engineering	  students,	  faculty,	  and	  professional	  
engineers.	  We	  then	  characterized	  and	  compared	  the	  epistemic	  practices	  of	  professional	  
engineers	  to	  engineering	  students.	  This	  process	  revealed	  how	  students’	  epistemic	  practices	  
are	  developing,	  and	  furthermore	  how	  they	  should	  develop	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
epistemic	  practices	  that	  professional	  engineers	  hold.	  	  
Our	  analysis	  of	  the	  epistemic	  practices	  obtained	  through	  these	  interviews	  has	  resulted	  in	  
the	  development	  of	  a	  transparent	  and	  transferable	  approach	  to	  studying	  epistemic	  
practices	  and	  will	  be	  used	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  comparison	  between	  engineers	  and	  engineering	  
students.	  Using	  the	  data	  collected	  in	  this	  study	  has	  allowed	  us	  to	  begin	  testing	  and	  
implementing	  curricular	  materials	  to	  address	  conceptual	  understanding	  in	  a	  way	  that	  helps	  
shape	  student’s	  epistemic	  practices	  towards	  those	  of	  professional	  engineers.	  By	  
examination	  of	  where	  students	  begin	  from	  an	  epistemological	  point	  of	  view	  to	  where	  they	  
will	  need	  to	  be	  as	  professional	  engineers,	  we	  have	  been	  able	  to	  establish	  an	  informed	  
model	  of	  students’	  epistemic	  practices	  and	  how	  they	  develop	  into	  the	  engineers	  that	  will	  be	  
needed	  in	  the	  future.	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Tara Gonzalez * 
Technology Readiness Levels: a common language or a common pain? 
Vannevar Bush’s 1945 report Science: The Endless Frontier stated “new products and new processes do 
not appear full-grown … [they] are painstakingly developed by research in the purest realms of science;” 
thus introducing the linear model of innovation into the lexicon of the U.S. federal government. As the 
name implies, the linear model relies on a forward path from basic scientific concept progressing to 
applied laboratory work and ultimately leading to a technology development, in this order. Many 
scholars, including the recent work by Narayanamurti and Odumosu, argue that the U.S. government’s 
categorization of science as “basic” and “applied” is not conducive to how great scientific and technical 
advances take place.  
I will present on one aspect of the linear model that has become deeply rooted in the government: 
Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs). TRLs were developed by Stan Sadin at NASA Headquarters in 1974 
as a way to discreetly categorize the stages of technology development. Measured on a scale from 1-9, 
in TRL 1 the basic principles are observed and reported and a TRL 9 a system was proven through 
successful mission operations. Since their inception, TRLs have become a pervasive basis for federal R&D 
funding policy in scientific and engineering agencies including the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. 
Department of Energy, NASA and others, despite scholars’ misgivings about the linear model. An 
argument commonly made in defense of TRLs is that they represent a “common language” of 
technology development, in which all parties will understand what has been done and what is left to do 
to bring a product to market.  
To evaluate the impact on TRLs in various program at NASA and the U.S. Department of Energy, I used a 
mixed methods approach to assess the plans for developing technologies as well as the perceived needs 
for new technology in the future. I interviewed managers and engineers involved in developing TRLs 
about their experiences with technology development and the effect that the TRL framework has on 
their work. I explored instances where program managers are restricted to work on technology 
development to defined, discreet TRLs in order to continue project funding. My work seeks to identify if 
there is a single most appropriate method of defining technology development to advance federally 
funded R&D, or if this “common language” cannot actually exist. 
* All views and opinions expressed in this paper are the views of the author and do not necessarily
represent the U.S. Department of Energy, NASA or the United States Government.  
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Exploring knowledge, values, rationale and how they influence engineering and 
technology: The case of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline 
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Topic: Track 1: Philosophy of engineering and technology 
Abstract 
This project started the day an engineering graduate student knocked upon my door and asked 
me, “What makes a good pipeline versus a bad pipeline?” This normative question regarded a 
proposed pipeline designed to transport liquefied natural gas in a 42” diameter steel tube under 
high-pressure from West Virginia to coastal Virginia and North Carolina. The proposed Atlantic 
Coast Pipeline was being reported in local news organizations because of a proposed route 
running through a nearby county. In the spirit of shared learning, we considered the types of 
questions that might arise as we probed the larger normative question.  Those discussions 
spurred us to make connections and garner support from additional colleagues.  A set of research 
questions were deliberated and the group agreed to explore the societal processes that authorize 
(or reject) pipelines; demographic characteristics of communities that may (or may not) host 
pipelines; the values held by potentially affected communities related to eminent domain, 
outdoor recreation, and trust; and their perceptions of risks posed by the proposed project. Data 
from a direct survey instrument (n=272), public workshops (3 events), as well as geographic 
information and publically reported media and research reports offered evidence for our inquiry. 
The research team worked to uncover how pipelines are procedurally brought into existence 
through federal permitting processes, which differ greatly from processes in other contemporary 
nation-states. That inquiry revealed the forms of knowledge and normative criteria privileged in 
the engineering designs and by public entities with formal institutional authority.  The values of 
material and energy efficiency guide designs that reflect ‘straight line’ thinking, rather than 
systemic or network-oriented design. The aspirations for control and authority informed the 
proposed route selection and eliminated many possibilities of co-location or shared 
infrastructures.  The demographic characteristics reveal an undercurrent of preferences to 
distribute greater risks in aging, rural communities.  The process showed which stakeholder 
could offer resistance that directly influenced the design (e.g. US Forest Service), while other 
stakeholders’ views were rather ineffective (e.g. Friends of Nelson County). This project offers 
an approach to combat the notion of “disengagement” as discussed by Erin Cech’s 2014 study of 
engineering education.  The shared inquiry offered insights into what counts as legitimated 
information and how engineering designs of largescale infrastructure systems can re-engage with 
issues of place, demographics, and societal values, which are often deemed ancillary factors in a 
“rational” engineering decision-making process. Understanding the philosophy of engineering 
and the technologies created (or not created) demands shared inquiry into the processes through 
which social and political organizations bring technologies into existence (or not) and an 






















































































Robots as Others Expectations Moral Agents: From Human to Interactive Relationships 
The conception of robots as moral agents is often criticized. Moral agents are thought to be (1) 
individuals with a subjective life with which others can enter into some type of relationships and 
(2) able to make autonomous decisions on the basis of some ideas of right and wrong. Both (1) 
and (2) make it possible for moral agents to be held morally accountable for their actions, that is, 
emotionally or rationally criticized with an aim of reformation.  
The argument against robots as moral agents thus concerns emotional subjectivity and autonomy 
or free will. First, those who reject robots as moral agents argue that robots do not have 
subjective emotional states. People, who do have subjective emotional states, thus cannot 
participate in emotional relationships with robots, something they can do with human moral 
agents. Second, it is pointed out that robots do not have autonomy or free will. Robots do not act 
on their own intentions or purposes. The purposes of robots spring wholly from their engineering 
designers or programmers. Thus robots cannot be held morally accountable or subjected to 
emotional or rational criticism with an aim of reforming them.  
The conceptions of moral agency on which these arguments rest deserves to be reconsidered. 
Consider, first, the issue of emotional subjectivity. When humans perform actions, their 
emotional states are not directly visible to others, nor are their intentions and purposes. As a 
result, when making moral judgements about others, what we use are expectations about their 
actions and intentions — which always leaves some level of uncertainty in such judgments. The 
emotions and intentions of others are necessarily to some extent our projections. This 
anthropomorphism is especially pronounced in military and medical areas, where robots are 
regularly felt to be human-like moral agents.  
Second, even when robots are designed and programmed by engineers, it is not always possible 
to predict precisely what behaviors they will exhibit, any more than it is possible to predict the 
behaviors of autonomous human agents to which we attribute free will. Indeed, people often talk 
about intelligent machines such as autonomous vehicles and caring robots as performing moral 
actions independently their engineer designers and programmers. Finally, the more sophisticated 
robots are increasingly able to learn from their experience. This means that in principle there is 
no reason why they could not be held morally accountable for their actions, that is, criticized 
with an aim of reformation.  
I thus argue for a new conception of moral agency. For a robot to be a functional, anthropopathic 
moral agent, those who interact with it need only decide to treat it as a moral agent, that is, as 
having subjectivity and free will. Their expectations in these regards are sufficient. The classical 
conception of the moral agent as possessing its own emotions and intentions is transformed into 
what I call an others-expectation moral agent. In concrete, everyday human-robot interactions, a 
moral agent need not be defined by the moral states or free will of a subject, but interactive 
relationships.  
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Testing Technologies for Space: The Case of the Kepler Technology Demonstrator 
Before the Kepler Space Telescope was approved for full development into the exoplanet-finding 
tool it ultimately proved to be, its advocates first had to prove that the technology could work in 
the environment of space. The transit method of exoplanet detection required that the telescope's 
CCDs be able to distinguish incredibly small disruptions in emitted starlight. NASA in fact 
rejected the Kepler proposal multiple times and required various technology demonstrations 
before the mission was finally approved. The final hurdle required the construction of a Kepler 
Technology Demonstrator (KTD) that would simulate both the transits and the "noise" of space, 
and would test the CCD technology in this environment. This paper looks at the KTD and asks 
the following questions: What technical challenges had to be overcome in order to adequately 
simulate the mission objectives and perceived hurdles, and how were these overcome? How were 
technological and bureaucratic needs distinguished and addressed? What, if any, benefit to the 
final design of Kepler was gained from the KTD experience? This paper draws upon written 
reports from the KTD team as well as interviews with its two primary members. 
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On the philosophy of planning in asset-intensive maintenance campaigns 
Édison Renato Silva*, Domício Proença Jr.*, Roberto Bartholo* 
* Management and Innovation Area, Production Engineering Program, Coppe, Universidade Federal do Rio de
Janeiro 
Abstract 
ISO 55.000 (2014), the international standard for physical asset management, proposes a 
novel understanding of maintenance. It aspires to address the entire life cycle of assets, 
advocating predictive maintenance strategies that surpass preventive approaches to benefit 
from advances in monitoring and intervention. It transfigures departmental boundaries of 
organizations to recommend a nested structure centered on physical assets that reach up to a 
systemic purview of organizational management.  
Maintenance backlogs in large organizations include tasks that far surpass the possibilities of 
routine maintenance. Maintenance campaigns capable of keeping backlogs manageable have 
progressively become an industry standard. Campaigns may occur regularly or irregularly, 
address the backlog as a whole or focus on one particular aspect. 
Maintenance campaign planning and execution remains hostage to an organization’s 
philosophy of planning – what can, or should, be planned.  
To offer a polarity. 
One perspective presupposes that it is possible to plan maintenance activities down to the last 
detail and timing in anticipation. A plan is best the more detailed in action and time it can be.  
Another assumes that there is an inherent limit to what can be planned. Beyond a certain 
point, or in view of probable or possible variability, it is necessary to concede that decisions 
will be made by those involved ad hoc. A plan is best the more it supports adaptation.  
The prevalence of one or another perspective is contingent to the entropic stage of the assets 
of an organization. Fundamentally, this has to do with the inherent nature of the objects of 
planning. Some are amenable to human will. Some are beyond its reach.  
This paper discusses maintenance in asset-intensive organizations, offering a perspective that 
considers maintenance activities in light of the philosophy of planning, outlining 
consequences and discussing Brazilian examples. 
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Philosophical Observations and Applications in Systems and Aerospace 
Engineering 
Dr. Stephen B. Johnson 
President, Dependable System Technologies, LLC 
Abstract:   
This paper will describe several examples of recent practices in systems engineering and 
aerospace engineering research and development that should be of interest to the 
philosophy of technology community. These examples include cases in which 
philosophical and social concepts and practices are (or can be) implicitly or explicitly 
used in engineering, and cases that philosophers have investigated and found of interest 
in the past. 
There are several cases in which philosophical and social concepts have been explicitly 
used in engineering. Computer scientists use what they call “ontology” in the artificial 
intelligence and engineering process optimization communities. Engineers attempting to 
establish new engineering disciplines have used “philosophy-like” rigor in defining key 
terminology to establish core disciplinary concepts. In new theories of “system health 
management” and of systems engineering, sociological and cognitive concepts are used 
to ensure that the propensity of humans to make mistakes is baked into theory and 
practice.  
Engineers implicitly use some philosophical practices. Rhetorical ploys are quite 
common. One common practice is to change key terms to distinguish one engineering 
approach or practice from another. This is often used as an attempt to gain control of a 
newly forming discipline or to successfully compete against other approaches to acquire 
funding. Quantification is also a key form of engineering rhetoric. Attempts to create 
engineering disciplines, establish an engineering organization, or win an argument about 
a design or operational method can succeed or fail depending on the ability to generate 
and present quantitative results. 
I will also present some recent examples of “philosophically interesting” topics that have 
been and continue to be investigated by philosophers. One set of topics relates to 
axiomatic and model-based approaches to systems engineering disciplines, and the role of 
“laws” in science. Another relevant topic is that of borrowing theories such as that of 
control systems to other domains such as fault management and systems engineering. 
Issues of the cost of acquiring knowledge for new systems so as to reduce risks will be 
discussed. Finally, the nature of engineering provides useful insights into issues that have 
been of great importance in the philosophy of science. As the purpose of engineering is to 
build systems to achieve goals, goal-directed thinking and hence teleology is becoming 
increasingly important in intelligent system design. Another interesting aspect of 
engineering is that engineers have both a “God-like” view of their system in that 
understand its “purpose” as well as its internal design and workings. Despite this, those 
systems frequently perform in unexpected ways, proving that engineers design and build 
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“complex” systems that exhibit unintended and unexpected behaviors. This has often 
been discussed under the concept of “emergence” and also of “engineering disasters”. I 
will argue that “emergence” is another word for “ignorance” or limits to human 
knowledge, and that sociological concepts such as “normalization of deviance” should be 
reconceived as a pitfall in the necessary practice of learning from operational experience. 
Understanding Practical Problems in the Technological Age 
Problems are the element of our consciousness that link the actual and the desired. They signal 
our dissatisfaction with the present that spurs our resolve to change it. The problems we perceive 
and articulate, as well as how we articulate them, are important determinants of the actions we 
will take by means of technology to transform our world. The interplay between how we 
collectively perceive the world, how we perceive ourselves, and our awareness of technological 
possibilities -- thus our culture-- is what leads to our recognition of problems. In turn, the 
problems that we recognize guide our technological action in the world.  
Given that our models of the world (us and technology included) are always imperfect and that 
our ability to predict depends on the quality of our models, it follows that technological action 
will always change the world and our culture in ways that we do not fully anticipate, and 
therefore lead to imperfect worlds in which we are bound to discover new problems. We thus 
find ourselves in a circularity between technology and culture in which, the way we pose 
problems is central: the problems we pose depend on our culture and the technical solutions we 
implement in response to those problems change our culture.  
In an age of technological risks (bio-engineering, energy and climate, automation and AI, etc.) 
when major societal transitions are required to face those challenges, we must develop a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between society, problems, and technology. This deeper 
understanding will help us to approach technological debates with more clarity and to better 
understand the axiological thrust behind the artifacts that we create. I believe that the path to a 
more ethical use of technology is more likely achieved by a richer understanding of problems in 
engineering practice than by sprinkling ethical codes on already established ways of practicing 
engineering.  
Problem definition has remained cursory in engineering research and practice, often adopting a 
purely objectivist stance. This paper proposes a richer formulation of problems using concepts 
borrowed from pragmatics, social cognition, and rhetoric, and discusses some of the implications 
brought about by this new formulation. Section 2 discusses the current practice of problem 
posing in engineering, section 3 discusses the roles that technology plays in problem solving, 
section 4 introduces our theory of problems and a resulting taxonomy of technological action, 
section 5 summarizes the findings from this formulation effort and charts a path forward. 
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Software and Metaphors: the hermeneutical dimensions of 
Software Development 
Fernando Nascimento 
Bowdoin College - USA 
Traditionally, the most recognizable characteristics of software engineering are         
related to logical constructs, algorithmic thinking, and mathematical frameworks         
for optimizations; they are indeed at the heart of the practice. Nevertheless, an             
exclusive focus on them misses a fundamental aspect of the practice relating to             
its capacity to reinvent and reshape how humans act and experience the world.             
And this creative dimension has an intrinsically hermeneutical dimension. 
In the first part of this paper, we propose a phenomenological approach that             
describes how signs of this hermeneutical dimension can be recognized in the            
evolution of software engineering techniques. The evolutionary path of these          
techniques may be an effect of the increasing recognition that a critical part of              
software engineering is not merely the result of a set of analytical and             
algorithmically-driven procedures. However, it still requires a hermeneutical        
approach to achieve its ultimate social goal of enhancing human experiences           
through technological artefacts. 
The second part of this paper is devoted to a philosophical consideration of the              
findings of the initial descriptive approach in which we focus on the process of              
creating a new software entity or functionality. As we shall discuss, it involves a              
hermeneutical task to interpret the actions in the world that will be affected by the               
software being developed. The software developer is the hermeneut, and the           
considered objects are actions and experiences humans can perform or have in            
the world, actually or potentially. 
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To do so, we will use as our theoretical framework the works on hermeneutics of               
the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur . As David Kaplan mentioned in his article            1 2
about “Paul Ricoeur and the Philosophy of technology”, Ricoeur did not turn his             
attention to the “empirical dimensions of technology”. Nevertheless, Kaplan lists          
five aspects of Ricoeur’s work that are relevant to the philosophy of technology.             
The first of them is his “hermeneutic philosophy”. Kaplan highlights Ricoeur’s           
well-known discussion of how meaningful actions can be considered as texts:           
“The model of the text” . Ricoeur’s central objective is to apply the hermeneutical             3
methodology initially related to written texts also to human actions. By doing so,             
he proposes a new theoretical framework for hermeneutics that goes beyond           
texts and also encompasses human agency. This reframing of the hermeneutical           
scope allows us to consider how the creation of software artefacts can be seen              
as an interpretation of the reality. The concepts of fusion of horizon by H.G.              
Gadamer  and metaphor by P. Ricoeur  will be the basis of this inquiry. 4 5
We conclude by suggesting how productive imagination intrinsic to the          
metaphorical creation plays a significant role in the development of the software            
based on the developer’s interpretation of actions. When one considers the           
software products as re-descriptions of interpreted action, the imagination of the           
developer is essential to create a new synthesis between the actions interpreted            
and his technological horizon. 
1 A concise collection of Ricoeur's most influential texts on hermeneutics can be found in Ricoeur, 
Paul. 2013. ​Hermeneutics: Writings and Lectures​. Wiley. 
2 Kaplan, David M. “Paul Ricoeur and the Philosophy of Technology.” ​Journal of French and 
Francophone Philosophy​ 16, no. 1/2 (2006): 42–56. 
3  Ricoeur, Paul. "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered As a Text." ​Social Research​ 51, 
no. 1/2 (1984): 185-218. 
4 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. ​Truth and Method​. A&C Black, 2013. 
5 Ricoeur, Paul. “Metaphor and the Central Problem of Hermeneutics.” ​Graduate Faculty Philosophy 
Department, New School for Social Research​, 1973, 42–58. 
More than new technical devices: a semiotic look at the digital transformation of industry 
During the past decade, various programmatic writings have predicted that industry will undergo 
revolutionary changes in the course of the digital transformation. New engineering approaches in 
the context of the internet of things, cyber-physical systems and big data are expected to open up 
radically new paths of technical development. They will not only allow the creation of new kinds 
of technical artefacts, but also alter the process of technical design. In the future, engineering will 
accordingly be less concerned with the creation of static devices with a determinate function. It 
will instead revolve much more around the continuous evolution of larger superstructures whose 
parts have to be updated and adapted in short intervals. A clear distinction between design and 
maintenance tasks in engineering will become increasingly difficult and the work of engineers 
will rely much more on interactions with other groups of people involved with technology. 
In this paper, we study the effects of the digital transformation on manufacturing processes in 
industry, where a large number of different programmes have been started to support the 
introduction of novel technology. We focus in particular on transitions in engineering practice 
from old to new design and maintenance procedures. We propose that these transitions cannot be 
appropriately described as an adoption of a new toolset of engineering, but that they rather have 
to be compared to learning a new language. As such, they require a deeper semiotic study of the 
way how meaning is attributed to technology. 
Observations in different companies allow us to describe the learning process in more detail. All 
these companies have started projects to implement new technical solutions which involve cyber-
physical systems and big data. We look at the way how employees of the companies and their 
business partners gradually gain “fluency” in the new, digital “language”. We discuss the 
importance of “active speaking” in contrast to “passive listening”, not only to get a better grasp 
of the new vocabulary and grammar, but also to motivate the engagement with the new language 
instead of sticking to the old one. Furthermore, we look at the involvement of new interest 
groups in engineering, such as maintenance technicians and device users. Their involvement 
turns the attention to the collective effort necessary to make the transition and the media that 
allow participation. We present different examples of such media which either support design or 
maintenance activities. 
Our findings let us believe that the language-based approach can add an important new 
perspective to the study of engineering and technology. Current theories of technical artefacts 
and their design do not seem able to give a full account of the dynamic and fluidity of the digital 
transformation, especially when it comes to participatory activities in which engineers engage 
with other groups of people involved with technology. 
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SESSION IV 
Philosophy of engineering and philosophy of technology: separation or integration? 
The development initiated by the ‘empirical turn’ in the philosophy of technology have led to 
both an increased interest of philosophers in what engineers are doing and an increased 
participation of engineers in philosophical reflection on technology. This development, far from 
simply ‘perfecting’ the philosophy of technology, raises questions about the unity and coherence 
of the discipline of philosophy of technology – basically the question how the philosophy of 
engineering and the philosophy of technology hang together.  
Technology has two sides. The instrumentality side concerns the totality of human endeavours to 
control their lives and their environments by interfering with the world through using things in a 
purposeful and clever way. The productivity side concerns the totality of human endeavours to 
brings new things into existence that can do certain things in a controlled and clever way.  
Philosophy of technology before the empirical turn focused almost exclusively on the 
instrumentality side, taking the availability of all outer instruments for granted. Representatives 
of the empirical turn have advocated and attempted to execute a shift to the productivity side.  
Neither faces the question what perspective can unite the two sides. For the study of 
instrumentality, it is unclear how it is relevant whether the things made use of in controlling our 
lives and environments have been made by us first; if we could rely on natural objects to serve 
our purposes, the analysis of instrumentality and its consequences would not necessarily be 
affected. Likewise, for the analysis of what is involved in the making of artefacts, and how 
artefacts are to be understood, it seems irrelevant how human life, culture and society are 
changed as a result of them.  
What is more, for the productivity side alone, we can conceive of philosophy of engineering as 
the philosophy of a practice, similar to the way the philosophy of science sees it as practice. On 
the instrumentality side, in contrast, our use of objects can hardly be isolated from the totality of 
human existence as taking place in modern society. Philosophy of technology cannot be the 
philosophy of a practice, because that practice would cover almost anything we do. Technology 
is a totalizing phenomenon rather than a practice.  
Some may favour an independent philosophy of engineering, leaving philosophy of technology 
to continue focusing on the totalizing phenomenon of technology. That, however, would be a 
mistake. Engineering as a practice is much deeper integrated into the forms of organization of 
society than science. Whereas scientists publish their results, engineers sell them. The 
consequences of this for engineering methodology and epistemology have hardly been studied.  
Any form that the philosophy of engineering will adopt, therefore, must be open to ‘the other 
side’ in order to adequately understand its subject. As a consequence, there is both a possibility 
and a task for the philosophy of engineering to contribute to the unity and coherence of an 
overall field of philosophy of technology. I will present several suggestions on how philosophy 
of engineering can contribute to this. 
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Constructing Carnap as Conceptual Engineer in the World of Data Science 
When Rudolf Carnap designed inductive logics in the 1950s and 1960s, he designed them as 
conceptual tools to help clarify and systematize Bayesian Decision Theory; it is in this sense that 
Carnap, when he was at UCLA, engaged in Conceptual Engineering. He wasn't in the business of 
arguing how science should be done, or how science is done. Instead, he looked at past and 
current scientific practice in order to construct conceptual tools which anyone could use to help 
systematize and clarify the existing networks of scientific concepts.  
In this talk, I take a closer look at what it means to be a conceptual engineer in practice, from the 
point of view of Data Science. In addition to negotiating with business teams, choosing the right 
software/hardware tools, and choosing the right statistical visualizations, Data Scientists may 
also have to design their own statistical concepts -- concepts designed to help solve the practical 
problems of dashboard users. But for the Data Scientist to be successful, they have to wear many 
hats: they must successfully navigate the worlds of engineering, statistics, UI design, project 
management, quality control, human resource management, and so on.  
I argue this flexibility to adopt new roles, to adopt and merge new perspectives, is what is 
required for successful Conceptual Engineering, and that Carnap's failure to fully adopt this role 
agnosticism explains his failed attempt to adequately Conceptually Engineer inductive logic. 
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Revisiting Schön’s Reflection-in-Action 
in Transforming the Practice of Engineering Education 
David E. Goldberg 





















































Bringing the National Security Agency into the Classroom: Ethical Reflections on Academia-
Intelligence Agency Partnerships 
Academia-intelligence agency collaborations are on the rise for a variety of reasons. These can 
take many forms, one of which is in the classroom, using students to stand in for intelligence 
analysts. Classrooms, however, are ethically complex spaces, with students considered 
vulnerable populations, and become even more complex when layering multiple goals, activities, 
tools, and stakeholders over those traditionally present. This does not necessarily mean one must 
shy away from academia-intelligence agency partnerships in classrooms, but that these must be 
conducted carefully and reflexively. This paper hopes to contribute to this conversation by 
describing one purposeful classroom encounter that occurred between a professor, students, and 
intelligence practitioners in the fall of 2015 at North Carolina State University: an experiment 
conducted as part of a graduate-level political science class that involved students working with a 
prototype analytic technology, a type of participatory sensing/self-tracking device, developed by 
the National Security Agency. This experiment opened up the following questions that this paper 
will explore: What social, ethical, and pedagogical considerations arise with the deployment of a 
prototype intelligence technology in the college classroom, and how can they be addressed? How 
can academia-intelligence agency collaboration in the classroom be conducted in ways that 
provide benefits to all parties, while minimizing disruptions and negative consequences? This 
paper will discuss the experimental findings in the context of ethical perspectives involved in 
values in design and participatory/self-tracking data practices, and discuss lessons learned for the 
ethics of future academia-intelligence agency partnerships in the classroom. 
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Brian Dewhurst* 
Engineering at what cost, to what purpose? The US federal budget process as a site for 
responsible innovation and engineering ethics work.  
This presentation will overview how the budget process works with a focus on NASA and the 
U.S. federal agencies’ process for deciding engineering and science budget priorities. For 
those studying engineering, the rationale for studying the budget process may not be obvious. 
The budget process is the cornerstone for laying out plans which will then be used to hold the 
agency accountable and to describe the agency’s proposed value for society. When there are 
scarce resources, managers must decide on what they care about and value and choose among 
projects. In some ways budgeting is the preeminent policy process for any agency, as the 
allocation of resources is where the ‘rubber meets the road’ for prioritization (Sarewitz 2007). 
Budgeting also raises significant challenges about how to synchronize budget with technical 
engineering plans. In reviewing the history of aerospace cost growth, Kranz and Dyer argue 
that managing a complex system within constrained budget and schedule totals gets at the 
limits of human rationality and capability (Kranz and Dyer 2015, Wiltshire et al 2017). 
Regardless, analysis to inform budgets and technical planning always continues, and 
occasionally good budgeting can significantly shape the future trajectory of engineering work 
through careful analysis.  
I will provide suggestions about how engineering ethics and responsible innovation 
(collectively summarized here as RI) scholars can tweak and augment the budget process. The 
rationale for this can be simply put: If an outside scholar or government manager wants RI 
issues to be important to an agency, then it needs to be part of budget process. To broadly 
transform engineering efforts, RI may need to become a factor in how agencies select and 
fund projects, with discussions across multiple levels of management and planning needed to 
properly connect budget decisions to technical plans. The multi-year nature of federal 
budgeting also must be considered, with the need to give early initial guidance prior to 
starting a year’s budget process in order to try to get the necessary technical data to make 
meaningful high-level budget trades.  
Based on my analysis, I will expound on changes and work needed for RI to potentially 
change the budget process. First, institutionalizing RI into the budget likely requires the need 
to train even thoughtful budget analysts, which is already difficult as many analysts struggle 
with the art of how to connect cost to technical plans. Second, if one wants to have rich 
discussions of the ethical implications of competing engineering tasks, typically resources 
must be spent to create the time and effort of assessing them from a societal and ethical 
perspective. Requesting that agencies fund such work (with as with the Human Genome 
Project’s dedication of a percentage of funds to Ethical, Legal and Societal Implications 
research) may be important. Third, getting buy-in at both the working level of technical 
planning as well as at agency leadership, due to the need to get programmatically viable plans. 
Lastly, public budget documents (known as Congressional Justifications) reflect an important 
site for public debate on an agency’s plans, and can be a beneficial point of focus for RI 
advocates to request RI-related detail and to in turn applaud agency efforts on RI.   
*Opinions and views expressed in this article reflect the views of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of NASA or the United States Government. 
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“Can Saying Make It So?” J. L. Austin and the Philosophical Foundations for the Modern 
Construction of the Role of Communication in Engineering Practice. 
Rick Evans 
In my last fPET paper, I stated that current engineering communication theorists understand 
communication as “socially situated practice,” as context-bound everyday social action. (Parretti, 
McNair and Leydens, 2014).  Furthermore, I claimed that Wittgenstein in Philosophical 
Investigations, in particular, through his presentation of the “language-game” was a possible (if 
unacknowledged) source for that understanding. He states that “the term ‘language game’ is 
meant to bring into prominence the fact that the ‘speaking’ of language is part of an activity 
(italics my own)” (Wittgenstein, 2009). Indeed, recent research into communication in 
engineering contexts finds “there is something intrinsic about engineering practice that requires 
extensive interaction with other people” (Williams & Figueiredo, 2014).  
In my current paper, I propose to focus on another philosopher of language, J. L. Austin. Along 
with Wittgenstein, Austin was troubled by the prevailing understanding of “language as an 
abstract referential system” (Potter, 2001).  Wittgenstein’s response was to issue a directive: 
“…don’t think, but look” and by looking “bring back words from their metaphysical to their 
everyday use” (Wittgenstein, 2009). Specifically, he encouraged us attempt to “get a clear view,” 
to focus on what is important – “seeing what is in common,” those “family resemblances” or the 
“rules we follow” in order to play language games (Wittgenstein, 2009). That is exactly what 
Austin attempted to do. 
In his opening lecture at Harvard, the first of twelve, Austin (1962) posits a dichotomy, two 
kinds of utterances, the constative and the performative. The performative, he states, “is derived 
… from ‘perform’… [and] indicates … the performing of an action,” the alternative to “just
saying something” (Austin, 1962). In the remainder of those lectures, Austin provides a 
taxonomy of the kinds of performatives and the conditions under which they can be understood 
as “happy” or “unhappy,” valid or not. However, as he brings back words to their everyday use, 
Austin abandons this dichotomy “in favor of more general families of related and overlapping 
speech acts” (Austin, 1962). In effect, he states that “perhaps we have here not really two poles, 
but rather a historical development” and that “every genuine speech act is both” (Austin, 1962). 
I believe with Austin that every genuine speech act is both and that, in fact, what we are 
experiencing is a historical development in our understanding of the role of communication in 
engineering and professional practice. I begin by providing a brief description of how, by 
attending to the “very widespread and obvious,” Austin discovers what is in common, those 
resemblances, the rules (Austin, 1962). Next, I argue that instead of stating the aim of that 
development or forecasting its result, Austin illustrates how that development should proceed – 
“saying [indeed showing] what ought to be done rather than doing something” (Austin, 1962). 
Finally, I suggest that only through studying words in “their everyday use,” as Wittgenstein 
encourages, and communication that “cannot fail to have been already noticed,” as Austin 
elucidates, will we learn about that “something intrinsic about engineering practice that requires 
extensive interaction with other people.” 
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A Thousand and One Engineering Stories 
Anne Meixner 
Engineers thrive on working on and solving difficult problems. Not every engineer gets to build the 
Brooklyn Bridge [1], yet the design of every rivet in a bridge whether rural or the Brooklyn Bridge has a 
story worth sharing. Stories from everyday engineers can help others learn from their challenges, 
mistakes, practices and triumphs. In this presentation, I intend to demonstrate the value in 
collecting and sharing stories in a creative outlet that engages and motivates engineers in the 
workplace. In addition, this collection of stories can augment the existing literature on the philosophy of 
engineering. 
As engineers we attend college to learn the fundamentals and current technology. In the workforce, we 
apply technology and contribute to developing new technology. We share our knowledge with our peers 
at work and at technical conferences. Yet along the way we learn something else-- craft.  Like a trade 
apprenticeship, engineers share craft via adages, expressions of the trade and stories. 
We share engineering stories over beers, coffee, meals that speak to the core of how engineers make 
the impossible possible and the everyday sustainable. Every engineer has at least one story describing 
craft. Technology provides the backdrop for this kernel of engineering wisdom. Hearing such a story a 
seasoned engineer may nod their head. A recent college graduate listens and stores away that kernel. A 
seed planted that makes them a better engineer.  
We view these engineering stories as untapped knowledge that lacks a forum for wider dissemination. If 
collected, these stories can contribute to a compendium of stories that illustrate the craft of 
engineering. These stories support the fresh out of college engineer. These stories inspire and validate 
the seasoned engineer. Such stories provide the everyday perspective on the craft of engineering. Such 
stories augment the philosophical and epistemological works of the prolific Harry Petroski [2] and 
Samuel Fordham [3] and the recent writings of Guru Madhavan [4]. These vignettes of engineering work 
complement the longer biographical works that focus on teams of engineers [5-7] or individuals [8-12].   
The Engineers’ Daughter website provides a mechanism to share the craft of engineering. Not through 
technical manuals but through stories that quench one’s curiosities. In phase one, the presenter shared 
stories from her own career. In phase two, we will publish stories from other engineers. As we began 
phase two a dilemma unfolded-- busy people don’t have the time to write their story. Solution- we use 
the oral history practices of Studs Terkel [13] and Story Corp [14] to bring an engineer’s story to life on- 
line. From July 2017 to October 2017 we collected audio from three individuals and ran a pilot story 
telling experience. These oral histories are being curated for publication starting in Feb 2018. 
Collecting a thousand and one engineering stories—yes it’s an audacious goal. But worthy of pursuit, 
because every problem solved has a story. A story that illustrates the human endeavor and passion for 
finishing the job. 
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The Alchemy of Maintenance Art 
By Caitlin Foley & Misha Rabinovich 
Our dreams lead us on, and we would do well to cultivate the right dreams. Our media scape 
has been permeated by dystopian science fiction from the last century and the big budget films 
that draw upon them. As a lot of those dystopian predictions come true, perhaps we should ask: 
Are we are living in an age of self-fulfilling prophecies? Wouldn’t our cultural imaginary benefit 
from being seeded with some utopic alternatives? Cultural producers such as the late Ursula Le 
Guin has urged us to take seriously the need to actively imagine utopic alternatives to the status 
quo (1). As we face off with a plethora of wicked problems e.g. climate change and oligarchy, 
perhaps we should take a step back and ask if more innovation is the answer. It seems to us 
that at this point in our development it is not technology that is our bottleneck. The true 
challenge lies in how we apply our technology and how we distribute the gains of innovation. 
We need a new shared vision, and the realm of cultural imagination is the domain of art. In our 
own artwork we strive to engage ideas and practices that involve sharing communities, livable 
ecologies, and the transmutation of waste. We believe that by embracing maintenance art, our 
work offers opportunities to explore pluralism in a playful and accessible manner. The 
Maintenance Art manifesto by Mierle Laderman Ukeles is more than four decades old, however 
it continues to inspire those who place it into the contemporary context of cultural and economic 
privatization.  
In our artwork we create participatory installations, games, and happenings where audience 
participation is a key component of the work and its message. Our arcade-style game ​Total 
Jump​ trains people for a coordinated worldwide jump. The near impossibility of accomplishing a 
total jump combined with the ease and fun of training for it invites the audience to bridge the gap 
between a postmodern pluralistic world and the necessity of globally coordinated solutions in 
the face of the Anthropocene. Our ​Shareable Biome ​project is rooted in a fascination with 
microbiome theory and Western culture’s recent adoption of the Fecal Microbiota Transplant 
(FMT) as a radically life-saving probiotic procedure. The rapidly increasing accessibility of this 
treatment is largely due to the work of maintaining microbial diversity by such groups as the 
nonprofit stool bank OpenBiome. The data that OpenBiome shared with us has been feeding 
our artistic research, visualizations, and lecture-performances. Like the bacterial culture in the 
gut, human culture is also threatened by monoculture run astray, e.g. the manosphere, the 
alt-right, etc. The ecological need for a diverse microbiome is a fertile analogy for a multitude of 
cultural struggles in which sharing communities play a key role. 
1. Le Guin, Ursula. “National Book Foundation’s medal for Distinguished Contribution to





Measuring the Success of Emerging Technologies:  
The Case of Brain-Computer Interfaces and the Illiteracy Metric 
Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are implantable devices that allow for computer-mediated interaction between a 
person’s brain activity and their environment. Examples of devices currently in development or use include those aimed at 
controlling prosthetic limbs, and the treatment of Parkinson’s, epilepsy and depression. They work by analyzing brain 
activity (e.g. to determine an intention to move, or the beginnings of a seizure or depressive episode), and then translate 
that activity into action (e.g. the movement of a prosthetic arm, or therapeutic neurostimulation to prevent or mitigate a 
seizure or depressive episode).  
Given cultural connections between the brain and identity, as well as worries about mind control, privacy and 
‘neurohacking’ (to name a few examples), significant attention has been rightly paid to the ethics of BCIs. However, in 
this paper, I want to raise a question that I contend has yet to receive sufficient attention from philosophers and 
technology scholars: what are the ethical and political implications of the way we measure BCIs? In other words, what are 
the normative implications of the practices, instruments, and concepts that go into measuring and assessing the success of 
this emerging technology?  
I ask this question via a case study of the use of a metric known as ‘BCI illiteracy.’ There exists a subset of the population 
who, despite continued training, are unable to use BCIs. This failure is usually due to problematic translation between 
brain activity and action - e.g. the BCI simply cannot accurately ‘read’ the brain signals produced by the individual, 
usually for unknown reasons. BCI researchers call this phenomenon ‘BCI illiteracy’ and report that it affects 15 – 30% of 
all BCI users (Thompson, draft). Drawing on research and methods in the philosophy of technology, the philosophy and 
sociology of measurement, and disability studies, I argue that the use of ‘BCI illiteracy’ as a metric for success encodes a 
problematic model of human-technology interaction. In particular, it places responsibility for the ‘failure’ on the 
individual BCI user, as opposed to the technological system. This has implications for how the BCI user perceives herself 
in relation to the technology, and also on how neuroscientists and engineers understand and engage in their work, and thus 
on how the technology develops. As such, the case of the BCI illiteracy metric illustrates how instruments and practices of 
measurement serve as significant sites for the interaction of science, technology and values.  
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Is CRISPR-Cas Really Revolutionary? (Word Count: 496) 
The new molecular tool, CRISPR-Cas, has made targeting precise stretches of DNA for editing 
much more common place in biology labs across the world. CRISPR (short for clustered, 
regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats) is a programmable, single-guide RNA that 
targets specific genes by base-pairing to DNA. A DNA-cleaving enzyme (Cas) is then recruited 
to the site and induces a double strand break, where DNA repair mechanisms rejoin the broken 
strands resulting in either the introduction or removal of nucleic acid bases to an organism’s 
genome. This technology has made possible investigations that were at one time not possible. 
Today, CRISPR-Cas has been used for a myriad of purposes including genome-wide knockout 
screens, loss of gene function studies, and even human embryo modification. Many discussions 
emphasize CRISPR-Cas’ exciting applications as if its development represents a “watershed 
moment” in genetics research (Baylis et al. 2016). It has been characterized as a “scientific 
breakthrough,” an “exponential advance,” and “unprecedented” (Travis 2015; Chari et al. 2017). 
Several commenters have raised ethical concerns about the possibility of do-it-yourself genome 
engineering projects carried out by non-experts, of the de-extinction of long lost species, of 
population-level genome changes, and of human germ-line modification (Smolenski 2015; Charo 
et al. 2015).  
But is CRISPR-Cas really revolutionary? Understanding the advancement(s) this technology 
represents requires an appreciation of existing biological technologies. Many of the functions 
CRISPR-Cas enables researchers to carry out have been functions that other biological 
technologies have made possible. For instance, protein based gene-editing tools, such as Zinc 
finger nucleases and TALENs, are also capable of making precise changes to genomes and 
continue to be used widely (Geurts et al. 2009; Joung et al. 2013). Many initially expected 
CRISPR-Cas to have superior precision and fewer off-target effects than these other gene-editing 
technologies. Yet, as our understanding of CRISPR-Cas amasses, it has become increasingly 
apparent that researchers face many of the same limitations when using Zinc finger nucleases 
and TALENs (Schaefer 2017; Peng et al. 2016; Ma et al. 2017). All three gene-editing tools have 
variable success when it comes to minimizing unwanted off-target edits, when it comes to 
delivery into a host, and when it comes to replacing a gene sequence by homologous DNA 
repair.  
CRISPR-Cas’ advancement is not unprecedented gene-editing capacities, but rather the ease and 
cost-efficiency with which the programmable guide RNA is produced. The rate at which 
customized guide RNAs are made is immensely faster than the rate at which effective Zinc 
finger and TALE proteins can be synthesized. Furthermore, the cost of producing customized 
single-guide RNAs is more affordable than the cost of making other gene editing tools (Ledford 
2015). These improvements are primarily responsible for the widespread adoption and expanded 
uses of CRISPR-Cas in many labs.  
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A proper understanding of the advancements made possible by CRISPR-Cas helps us see that it 
does not stand out from other gene-editing tools in many ways. Much of the acclaim and ethical 
concern attributed to CRISPR-Cas is properly attributed to other technologies as well. 
References 
Baylis F., J. Rossant. 2016. “This CRISPR Moment.” The Walrus. 
Chari R., G. Church. 2017. “Beyond Editing to Writing Large Genomes.” Nature Reviews: 
Genetics, volume 18. 
Charo R. A., H. T. Greely. 2015. “CRISPR Critters and CRISPR Cracks.” The American Journal 
of Bioethics, 15(12): 11-17. 
Joung J., J. Sander. 2013. “TALENs: A Widely Applicable Technology for Targeted Genome 
Editing.” Nature Review: Molecular Cell Biology, Volume 14. 
Leford H. 2015. “CRISPR, the Disruptor.” Nature, Vol. 522. 
Ma H., N. Marti-Gutierrez, S. Park, J. Wu, Y. Lee, K. Suzuki, A. Koski, D. Ji, T. Hayama, R. 
Ahmed, H. Darby, C. Van Dyken, Y. Li, E. Kang, A. R. Park, D. Kim, S. Kim, J. Gong, Y. Gu, 
X. Xu, D. Battaglia, S. Krieg, D. Lee, D. Wu, D. Wolf, S. Heitner, J. Belmonte, P. Amato, J. 
Kim, S. Kaul, S. Mitalipov. 2017. “Correction of a Pathogenic Gene Mutation in Human 
Embryos.” Nature, Vol. 000. 
Peng R., G. Lin, J. Li. 2016. “Potential Pitfalls of CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Genome Editing.” 
FEBS Journal, 283. 
Schaefer K., W. Wu, D. Colgan, S. Tsang, A. Bassuk, V. Mahajan. 2017. “Unexpected 
Mutations after CRISPR-Cas9 Editing in vivo.” Nature Methods, Vol. 14, No. 6. 
Smolenski J. 2015. “CRISPR/Cas9 and Germline Modification: New Difficulties in Obtaining 
Informed Consent.” The American Journal of Bioethics, 15(12): 35-68. 
Travis J. 2015. “Breakthrough of the Year: CRISPR Makes the Cut.” Science, Vol. 350, Issue 
6267. 
Solar Geoengineering: A Case Study in Slippery Slope 
Arguments Against Emerging Technologies 
David R. Morrow 
American University 
Critics of emerging technologies sometimes appeal to fears of a slippery 
slope to argue that engineers and researchers should not pursue the 
technology any further. Genetic engineering, they warn, will lead to 
designer babies. Artificial intelligence, they predict, will lead to mass 
unemployment or even human extinction. Supporters of a particular 
technology tend to dismiss these arguments, but under what conditions 
are they worth taking seriously? 
This paper uses the case of solar geoengineering as a case study in 
slippery slope arguments. Solar geoengineering is a proposed technique 
for limiting climate change. It would involve reflecting a small fraction of 
incoming sunlight back into space before it can warm the planet. While it 
seems likely that these technologies could reduce global warming, there 
would be distributional and intergenerational effects, adverse 
environmental side effects, and other ethical concerns. Near-term research, 
however, would not carry any of those risks.  
Nonetheless, critics of solar geoengineering frequently use a 
slippery slope argument (SSA) to oppose even small-scale research into 
solar geoengineering, such as environmentally negligible outdoor 
experimentation. They warn that allowing such research will lead 
inevitably to some kind of undesirable deployment of solar geoengineering. 
This paper explains the logic needed for a cogent SSA against small-scale 
research. It collects and expands on five processes that have been 
suggested in the literature by which research might lead to undesirable 
deployment: vested interests that push for further research and eventual 
deployment; what Dale Jamieson calls the “cultural imperative” to deploy 
new technologies once they are available; a gradual process of 
“legitimation” or “normalization” of solar geoengineering; a “moral hazard” 
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effect that undermines climate change mitigation, thereby setting the 
world on an otherwise avoidable path toward solar geoengineering; and 
the enabling of rogue actors to deploy solar geoengineering unilaterally. It 
then analyzes the plausibility that each of these processes might lead us to 
an undesirable outcome, while drawing out some special complexities 
related to uncertainty and dynamic preferences. The paper concludes that 
while some of these processes will likely exert some pressure toward 
deployment, none of the proposed mechanisms seem especially powerful, 
and so while the SSA against solar geoengineering has some merit, it is far 
less powerful than critics of solar geoengineering often assume. 
The talk will conclude by discussing how to apply the lessons from 
the case of solar geoengineering to other emerging technologies. 
SESSION V 
Title: The dynamics of perspective-taking in discussions on socio-technical issues 
Ayush Gupta, Chandra Turpen, Andrew Elby, Thomas Phillip 
The work of professional engineers is socio-technical, in that the technical solutions they 
produce have deep short and long-term impact on the social, political, and economic fabric of 
society at small and large geopolitical scales (Bucciarelli, 2008). As such, in most real-world 
engineering problems, stakeholders in any specific issue come from a huge variety of spheres 
representing, for example, business, government, policy, public and labor interests.  Engineers 
often need to work with these different stakeholders in teams that are themselves inter-
disciplinary. To create solutions that attend to welfare of the public and the different stakeholder 
interests in an ethical manner it is important that professional engineers be able to understand, 
empathize with, and represent multiple perspectives in the context of a specific issue (Brown & 
Wyatt, 2010). But changing perspectives, to look at a topic from some other actor’s viewpoint 
can be challenging, especially if the viewpoints are in conflict, represent different interests, or 
draw on experiences situated in very different economic or political realities. So it is important to 
create models of how current and future engineers engage in perspective-taking in socio-
technical contexts. This has been an underexplored topic in engineering education research. 
Drawing on King and Kitchener’s reflective judgment model (1004), Ziedler et al. (2009) 
characterize how engineering students in clinical interviews argue when presented with multiple 
perspectives on a specific issue such as alcoholism. Adams’ matrix of informed design 
characterizes how trajectories of expertise in design might be aligned with greater ability at 
taking multiple stakeholders into account. We aim to build on this work, by characterizing how 
future professional engineers negotiate multiple perspectives in the context of a socio-technical 
issue in a group-discussion setting over multiple days of discussion. Our data comes from video 
records of a cohort of 6 engineering students (seniors and graduate students) discussing the 
impact of introducing waste-management technologies in India under the Kyoto Protocol. The 
students met for 4 focus group sessions of 1.5 hours each. We draw on the notions of narrative 
analysis (Wortham, 2000) and stance (Goodwin, 2000) to attend to (i) how the different 
perspectives students are taking on position the stakeholders in different relationships with 
respect to each other and draw on broader socio-political ideologies, influencing how they 
evaluate the ethics in that specific situation and (ii) the interactional dynamics of the shifts in 
perspectives that are taken up by the students. Thus we aim to characterize empirically what it 
means to take on a perspective in discourse as well as the dynamics of how perspectives (and 
associated ideologies) are taken up and/or contested in the unfolding conversation. Through this 
we aim to build richer accounts of perspective taking in engineering ethics discussions and 
inform the design of learning environments for engineering ethics education. 
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From deontological to interpretative: Self-reflection and recognition of others 
Engineers are often taught that ethics entail adherence to codes of conduct offered by employers 
or specific engineering societies that inform the expectations for professional behavior. On the 
other hand, some engineers learn that research ethics are represented largely within the principles 
of Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR). Both of these approaches ask for engineers to learn, 
accept and conform to values that offered by external organizations. This is intended to support 
an individual’s decision-making in the face of future ethical quandaries. Prior scholarship by 
Joseph Herkert suggests there is a multi-layered set of ethical obligations that range for micro-
ethics to macro-ethics, which reflect the values and uphold the ethical obligations of professional 
societies. Authors van der Poel and Royakkers, whose work underscores how the “problem of 
many hands” gives rise to macro-ethical failures. This brings to light the notion that individuals 
or even large organizations are not solely responsible for unfolding innovation processes, 
implementation, and maintenance of engineered systems, as they lack complete control and 
authority.  
The challenges associated with a lack of complete control or authority are often handled in one 
of two ways that align with distinct philosophies of engineering. The first of these is the pursuit 
of greater control as exercised by myriad forms of power and authority. The second approach, 
and the main focus for this paper, stands in stark difference to aspirations for greater control. 
This approach, advocated by Mitcham’s recent article in Issues in Science and Technology is one 
of self-reflexivity and interpretation of broader social context that demands consideration for and 
learning about one’s self and relations to others. This interpretative approach is often referred to 
as the “reflexive practitioner”. While significant resources have been dedicated to case studies 
that support deontological ethics, there have been fewer resources committed to introducing 
practices of reflexivity into the philosophy of engineering. 
This project shares four approach to develop the capacity within undergraduate engineering 
students to consider their own values, recognize the values of others and explore their 
relationships to the broader societal context. This paper reports on data from 65 students that 
drafted 1-page essays on the question, “What is engineering?” at the outset of a one-semester 
course and then responded to the same prompt 15 weeks later. The educational interventions on 
reflexivity included activities that supported the students’ included written responses to semi-
structured prompts, stakeholder and network mapping, role-play with character cards, and 
reflection on aspects of candor and humility. These initial results suggest that reflexivity is 
relatable and serviceable for engineers. Reflexivity is a key aspect of many scholar’s frameworks 
for responsible innovation. This pedagogical approach aims to provide the space for students to 
move learning uncritical, duty-based ethical positions to a more interpretative, critically reflexive 
approach that acknowledges one’s own values, the rules (institutions) and expected behavior 
(norms) and acknowledges the values of others in a given decision-context. 
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Applying Interpersonal Mental Models of Privacy to the Internet of Things 
D.E. Wittkower    
The overwhelming majority of contemporary discussion of privacy focuses on personally 
identifiable information as property, and research on privacy nearly always finds, in what is 
called “the privacy paradox,” that users don’t care enough and in the right way about “privacy” 
as it has been framed in legal and technical contexts. This is a strikingly normative perspective, 
assuming that users’ mental models must be reformed in order to conform with legal-juridical 
models of privacy rather than designing systems to follow users’ intuitive mental models. It 
might be productive in a number of different ways to instead first ask in what way people do in 
fact care about privacy and to design and redesign policies to afford this good rather than trying 
to change human values to conform to our legal-technical environment.    
Following this initial framing, I outline an interpersonal phenomenology of privacy oriented by 
ethics of care, considering privacy as it appears in parenting, friendship, romantic and sexual 
relationships, and care for elderly and disabled persons. This phenomenology identifies three 
distinctive dynamics of privacy in interpersonal contexts. First, in considering maternalism and 
paternalism, we see that autonomy and privacy are traded against one another at either end of 
life, with the aging child requiring increasing privacy in order to feel self-determining, and the 
aging elder losing self-determination as privacy from caregivers becomes increasingly difficult 
to provide. Second, we see that maintaining differential levels of privacy toward different 
persons is a way in which some relationships are defined, this differentiation being a modulation 
of privacy described as ‘intimacy’. Third, a distinctive form of consent emerges in interpersonal 
contexts, one which is always temporally and contextually specific—consent in interpersonal 
contexts always requires renewal and even once granted is still never a given. 
These elements of the phenomenology of privacy in interpersonal contexts are then applied to a 
variety of kinds of IoT devices and systems will be discussed, chosen to represent a diversity of 
kinds of interactions and relationships within the IoT: GPS navigators, the Amazon Alexa virtual 
assistant, Nest, and two medical robots—PARO and RIBA. These applications are not thorough, 
but are intended only to indicate how rethinking privacy from users’ mental models produces a 
somewhat different set of concerns than those currently discussed as “privacy concerns,” casts 
those concerns differently, and indicates new directions for and kinds of reforms.  
The most distinctive and useful of these differences are drawn together into conclusions on two 
major themes. First, we note that privacy in a legal-juridical context is commodified relative to 
privacy in interpersonal contexts. This is most apparent in the economies of information 
exchange: in the legal-juridical context, loss of privacy is framed as loss, where, in the form of 
intimacy, it may appear instead as a gain in interpersonal contexts. Second, the strongly 
divergent understanding of consent as needing constant renewal rather than being a box to be 
checked in clickthrough licensing seems to demand transformative reforms from companies 
interested in engineering ethics. 
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Is an Engineered Life Worth Living for Humans? 
This is an effort to think about both the engineering life and the engineered life. The argument, 
first, is that the life of the professional engineer and the lives of all of us who live in the world 
being progressively designed, constructed, operated, and maintained by engineers are closely 
related. Second, critical philosophical reflection on the engineering-engineered life has primarily 
taken two forms: externally (among non-engineers) this way of life has been assessed in social 
justice terms; internally (among engineers) reflection has focused on celebratory apologetics in 
conjunction with some attention to professional ethics. What is missing is a philosophical 
anthropological examination of engineering life, a sketch of which will be developed here.  
In a well-known passage from the Apology, Socrates declares that “the unexamined life 
(ἀνεξέταστος βίος) is not worth living for humans” (38a). This is complemented in the Crito with 
a statement about humans should seek not simply to live (τὸ ζῆν) but to live well (τὸ εὖ ζῆν) 
(48b).  
In the Nicomachean Ethics I, 5, Aristotle observes that most people identify the good (ἀγαθὸς) or 
well being (εὐδαιμονία) with physical pleasure (ἡδονήν), but that two other ways of life are the 
political (πολιτικὸς) and theoretical (θεωρητικός). The life of pleasure, as a way of life shared 
with animals, is not distinctive of humans. The political life, which involves the pursuit of honor 
or esteem (τιμή), because of its dependence on others, falls short of something more self-
contained and thus higher, that is, the pursuit of theoretical or contemplative knowledge. Later at 
Nicomachean Ethics I, 7, and then again at greater length in X, 7, Aristotle defends at any length 
the life of theory or knowing as the highest form of the good.  
One way of life Aristotle fails to consider is that of artisans or makers of physical artifacts, who 
are actually praised by Socrates in the Apology as more wise than either politicians or poets. 
Like engineers and unlike politicians (who manipulate others with rhetoric) or poets (who are 
possessed by the gods), artisans do know something, namely, how to make things. It was not 
until the modern period, however, that making began to be conceived as a distinctive and 
distinctively human way of life.  
As the world progressively becomes an engineered artifact ― and as our lives become 
environmentally, medically, socially, and genetically engineered ― it is appropriate to ask 
ourselves to what extent this way of being in the world is truly human. One of the paradoxes of 
engineering experience today is that we simultaneously aspire to preserve who we have been 
(especially culturally, religiously, politically) and to innovate ourselves into something different 
(financially, socially, and even physically). Indeed, increasingly we undertake to design and plan 
out our lives after the manner of how engineers design artifacts or structures and plan out their 
construction, operation, and maintenance. Surely this suggests the appropriateness of subjecting 
the engineering way of life in its multiple manifestations to critical philosophical reflection. 
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Morphological Freedom:
Potential and Normativity in Transhumanism
Joshua Earle
Virginia Tech
Article X of the Transhumanist Bill of Rights states that all “Sentient entities” ought 
uphold “Morphological Freedom” – the right to do with one's physical abilities or intelligence 
whatever one wants so long as it does not harm others. In this talk, I will unpack the notion of 
morphological freedom, exposing assumptions which I believe will lead to greater inequality, 
and a race to the top mentality. I will also discuss what “harm” is believed to mean in this 
context, and what ways in which that belief is lacking. Through historical analysis of previous 
morphological adjustment, including cosmetic surgery, sex assignment surgery, and body 
modification, I will put the lie to the notion that the option for diversity in bodily arrangements 
necessarily leads to said diversity. Also, drawing on critiques of the neoliberal subject/self, I 
will describe how upholding the diversity that Morphological Freedom seems to want is 
necessary for producing the ultimate apotheosis of humanity which Transhumanists desire: 
networked minds. This will require an ethical re-formation of selves, communities, and the 
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Constructing Situated and Social Knowledge: Ethical, Sociological, and Phenomenological 
Factors in Technological Design 
By Damien Patrick Williams 
Virginia Polytechnic and State University 
Department of Science, Technology, and Society 
Designers, programmers, and others in the fields of technology and engineering are—
recently, and with increasing speed and urgency—coming to understand that there are many 
ways that human biases can become problems within the fields of engineering, programming, 
algorithmic systems, machine learning, artificial intelligence, and design. This means that when 
we design, program, train, or deploy technologies, we must remember that we are coding their 
data sets and designing their parameters from human-centered knowledge bases and assumptions 
about the world. 
In order to understand these assumptions and how they gets instantiated in our 
technological systems, we have to understand various social, psychological, and philosophical 
frameworks. We need to understand concepts such as intersectionality, embodiment, the 
extended mind hypothesis, epistemic valuation, phenomenological experience, and how all of 
these things come together to form the bases for our moral behavior and social interactions. 
In this paper, I will highlight several questions which represent categories of knowledge 
developed out of the phenomenological lived experience of members of various groups of 
people. Questions such as: "How do you walk home? Where are your keys?;" "What do you do 
when a police officer pulls you over?;" and "What kinds of things about your body do you 
struggle with whether and when you should tell a new romantic partner?" 
Via tools from intersectional feminist theory, feminist epistemology, disability studies, 
and phenomenology, I will use these questions to interrogate several assumptions about design, 
and to prompt the audience to think in a mode that may be unfamiliar to them. The audience will 
come to recognize that each of these questions represents a set of lived experiences and, in some 
cases, life or death concerns for people in the world and that, as such, these experiences must be 
understood and taken into account, when designing and deploying technological systems. 
As long as humans are the ones doing the work of translating their experience and 
understanding of the world into technologies and into the languages that other technologies can 
understand, those humans need to take pains to work in far more diverse groups of people, 
privileging traditionally under-served groups of people, and their categories and constructions of 
knowledge systems. In this way, designers and engineers and their resulting technologies will be 
far more likely to include the perspectives of those people who understand not only the existence 
of these questions and their implications, but also the epistemologies and life strategies that they 
represent. This increased understanding will broaden and deepen our understanding of what our 





































From interpersonal trust to trust in technology itself: blockchain as a 
responsible design material 
Yan Teng1, Guowei Jiang2
Abstract: While human-to-human trust has been widely accepted as the dominant paradigm of 
trust relations, trust issues arising between human and technology itself (TTI) has often been 
overlooked and doubted in the mainstream trust discourse. Much of the literature challenges the 
conceptual viability of TTI by either arguing that technology itself can only embody reliance or 
by classifying TTI as merely a metaphorical form of interpersonal trust. The core argument of 
these beliefs lies in the notion that technology itself lacks mental states that are normally 
considered essential elements accounting for interpersonal trust relations. This paper proposes to 
validate the notion of TTI from a value sensitive design (Friedman et al. 2002, van den Hoven et 
al. 2015) standpoint that by embedding the epistemology of interpersonal trust in the 
conceptualisation of technology, technology could be a trustworthy entity on itself while 
mediating a broader network of trust relations. We argue that a distinct difference between 
interpersonal trust and human-to-technology trust is that while goodwill of the former trustee is 
shown by some moral language of giving trust, goodwill embedded in technology will eventually 
be embodied and externalized in functions and features that are designed for meeting specific 
social values, psychological needs, and user experience. Hence, we could say that those 
technologies that have functions or features manifesting the imparted goodwill could qualify as 
the potential objects of trust relationships.  
By articulating the proactive designed features of the blockchain technology, we further argue 
that people have already engaged in creating new technologies with embedded values, which 
aims at being trusted and promoting trust. Blockchain technology originates from the concept of 
crypto currencies like bitcoins with its effort to remove the authentication of a centralized third-
party institution onto a Distributed Autonomous Organizations (DAO) where the objects of trust 
alternatively shift from human agency to a smart networking system. Emerging efforts have been 
found to extend the affordances of blockchains to build Decentralized APPs (DAPPs) based on 
the four core features of DAOs which we detected close relevance with the epistemology of trust 
in an interpersonal network: (1) Decentralized ledger distribution where each piece of record is 
restored and validated across the entire network. (2) Mutual consensus system where no change 
or rewrite is possible unless the majority of the stakeholders agree upon. (3) Smart contracts 
algorithm where transactions can only be executed based on the terms embedded in the database 
of agreements. (4) Ownership of data where every stakeholder has the right either to create, to 
protect or to share his personal ledger through an authenticated and verifiable routine. The 
affordances of such features of blockchain technology materialize the grounds of human goodwill 
like benevolence and conscientiousness (Jones 1996) which create a new form of algorithmic 
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trust that could be used as responsible design materials to fit into a broader variety of trustee 
networks to mediate trust relations between people, things, data and ecologies (Nissen et al. 
2017). 
Key words: trust, interpersonal trust, trust in technology itself, blockchain, responsible design. 
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Robots’ Potential to Enhance Caregiving Virtues and Practices 
In Shannon Vallor’s Technology and the Virtues: A Philosophical Guide to a Future 
Worth Wanting, she discusses the ongoing “global empathy deficit,” indicating that it is 
“not a novelty of the digital age” (Vallor 2016, 138). That said, Vallor also points out that 
depending on the type of technology and how it is used, it may contribute to sustaining, 
worsening, or improving this state of affairs. In our earlier work on robot caregivers, we 
argued that their use has the potential to lessen caregiving burdens and promote 
flourishing of both care recipients and human caregivers (2010). In this presentation, we 
will elaborate and expand on this earlier work, while addressing objections to the use of 
robot caregivers. Robots, among other technological interventions used in the context of 
caregiving, should complement and sustain good caregiving practices. Their use should 
foster the development of virtues related to caregiving, a goal highlighted in Vallor’s 
work.  
In this presentation, we will argue that shifting the emphasis of dialogues about human-
robot interaction (HRI) from moral agency to moral patiency may serve as a useful first 
step toward (a) enhancing caregiving practices and (b) fostering care virtues in humans, 
including empathy. To demonstrate this, we will draw on empirical research showing the 
impact of child-robot interaction (cHRI) on children’s interaction with other children and 
adults. We will also draw upon our earlier work on the impact of HRI on human-human 
interaction (HHI) among older adults. Against this background, we will discuss how the 
potential impact of treating robots as moral patients may affect the development of 
empathic concern for human beings.  While we acknowledge that the use of robot 
caregivers (or robot companions in other settings) can raise significant ethical concerns, 
viewing robots as moral patients could positively impact HRI, HHI, and at least begin to 
address the empathy deficit.  
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Title of the paper: PREHISTORIC STONE ARTIFACTS AND EPISTEMIC 
COMPLEXITY 
Name of the author: MANJARI CHAKRABARTY 
ABSTRACT 
In his 1997 paper Dasgupta draws an interesting distinction between systematic and epistemic 
complexity. Dasgupta (1997), following Herbert Simon (1962), calls entities systematically 
complex when they are composed of a large number of parts that interact in nontrivial or 
complicated ways. Thus even if one knows the properties of the parts one may not be able to 
infer or anticipate the behaviour of the system as a whole. Epistemic complexity refers to the 
richness (i.e., the amount, variety, and newness) of the knowledge embedded in an artifact; it 
entails the (old) knowledge that is used in and the (new) knowledge that is generated by the 
making of an artifact. 
Interestingly, there seems no direct connection between the two kinds of complexities. A high 
level of epistemic complexity does not necessarily follow a high level of systematic 
complexity (Dasgupta 1997). Prehistoric stone artifacts, choppers and hand-axes for example, 
which constitute ‘First Technology’ (Toth 1987), provide an exemplary case study of entities 
that are systematically simple (according to Simon’s criterion) but in light of recent 
archaeological studies (see e.g., Toth 1987; Jeffares 2010; Stout 2011) they appear 
epistemically quite complex (according to Dasgupta’s criterion).  Contrary to popular 
perception, these early lithic tools were not created by simply "bashing two rocks together" 
(Leaky 1994, 38); instead, their emergence, i.e. their manufacturing process, consisting of 
actual flaking techniques (including core examination, target selection, core positioning, 
hammer-stone grip selection and accurate percussion) in addition to acquiring raw materials 
of appropriate size, shape and composition (Jeffares 2010, 165; Stout 2011, 1051), 
constituted quite sophisticated and originali knowledge.ii The knowledge generated during the 
making of these stone artifacts was basically the knowledge of how certain kinds of structural 
forms and materials function, behave, perform, and appear under certain conditions. 
Following Michael Polanyi (1962) Dasgupta (1997, 117) characterizes such knowledge as 
operational principles.  
The present paper, divided into two sections, closely examines the nature of the epistemic 
complexity of one of the most widely distributed and longest-lasting early stone artifacts, 
namely, the Acheulean handaxe. Drawing on recent archaeological-prehistorical research the 
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first section aims to explore what kind of knowledge in the form of operational principles 
possibly had emerged during the making of these Acheulean handaxes. The second section 
seeks to understand how the making of these epistemically complex handaxes are possibly 
connected with the cognitive dimensions of early hominin technical activities. The 
voluminous archaeological record of stone tools, which has received little scholarly attention 
in mainstream philosophy of technology, is seen today as the richest source of evidence for 
the initial emergence of some form of hominin cognitive capacities (see, e.g., Wynn and 
Coolidge 2016; Moore and Perston 2016). The present study attempts to initiate a debate 
among philosophers of technology about whether or not these systematically simple but 
epistemically complex stone tools like Acheulean handaxes really played a critical role in the 
evolution of the early hominin cognitive abilities. 
i The creation of these early stone tools necessitated the production of new knowledge as there was no 
technological past to draw upon.   
ii The term ‘knowledge’ is used here in the Popperian (Popper 1972) objective sense and is to be understood as 
an evolutionary product of intelligent hominin or human behaviour that can be criticized and modified inter-
subjectively, and can improve by exosomatic (non-genetic) means our active adaptation to the world. 
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Humans, Trees, and Ethics 
Erik Nelson, PE, SE 
As an engineer working with wood — specifically, designing wood buildings — I developed an 
interest in better understanding our relationship with trees, how our history with trees and forests 
has changed over time, and what we have learned from living alongside and with our forests.   
Not only do trees provide clean air, store carbon, stabilize soils, and provide food and shelter, 
they also help us be better human beings and give us a broader foundation for discussions of 
ethics. 
I will present our complicated relationship with forests, which is fraught with success and failure, 
using American history as a guide.  I will describe significant environmental movements and 
forest land pioneers, alongside related ethical traditions.   For example, we changed from being 
afraid of the forests, as settlers, to land owners who exploited the land for economic gain, which 
eventually led to a timber famine. 
As part of this history, our nation’s first forester, Gifford Pinchot, led the early conservation 
movement using the ethic of utilitarianism.  Later, naturalist John Muir confronted this 
utilitarianism with a preservation movement centered on virtue ethics and theology, but devoid 
of the idea that God’s nature was primarily for human use.  These different views led to some 
controversy, pitting the conservationist against the preservationist, and helped usher in a new 
ethical framework, one not simply based on human interactions.  There was recognition that, for 
us to thrive, animals, plants and the land must thrive, as well. 
This created a new type of ethic, one based on impacts to the land.  Socrates, through Plato, 
asserted that people will do what is good, provided that they know what is right.  What is right is 
now broader that human to human interaction, and for Leopold Aldo, an action is right if “it 
preserves the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.”  For him, there is a need 
to understand the complexity of nature and balance the risks and rewards of human action with 
wide ecological lenses, sharpened by the scientific study of nature.   However, understanding 
how nature works, the evolutionary and survival processes, may also be contrary to an ethic 
based on human virtue.  Leopold did not think of his land ethic as fixed doctrine, but rather 
something that evolves within a community of caring citizens.  After all, he wrote, “nothing so 
important as an ethic is ever written.” 
Engineers, who design artifacts by reconstructing pieces and parts of the land—e.g., trees to 
create wooden structures—will be better served by reflecting on this history and these ethical 
traditions.   I will provide examples of how Leopold’s land ethic can help engineers make better 
decisions regarding the design and use of wood, as well as better evaluate the wood harvesting 
practices in the lumber industry.  This talk will argue that all of the main ethical traditions—
utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics—can be strengthened by thinking beyond human 
interests to include the intersections of animals, plants, and the land. 
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Socio-materiality and modes of inquiry 
Professor Anders Buch 
Department of Learning and Philosophy 
Aalborg University Copenhagen 
Denmark 
How can we understand the relationship between on the one hand engineers, technicians, 
designers, users of technology and on the other hand technological devises, products, and 
artifacts? In the philosophy of technology this relationship has been discussed extensively. 
Historically, philosophers have opted for explanatory strategies that span the spectrum from 
technological determinism to voluntarism. Contemporary theorizing of the problem has tried to 
avoid the extremes of the spectrum, and opted for a middle ground that leaves room for human 
agency while still recognizing the impact of technology on human activity. In Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) the question has been discussed as the ‘social shaping of technology’ and 
various theoretical frameworks have been put forward that stress the interwoven character of the 
social and the material, e.g. Social Construction of Technology (SCOT), Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT), and Agential Realism. Whereas there is general agreement in STS that the social and the 
material is related there is no general agreement about how the socio-material relationship should 
be understood. 
Ontological, epistemological and methodological issues tend to be interwoven in complex ways as 
STS researches have construed the relationship in different ways. How we understand the 
relationship has implications for extant notions of materiality, technology, society, agency, 
morality, ethics, and our ability to come to know the world we live in.  
This paper discusses the character of the socio-material relationship. The discussion will be guided 
by John Dewey’s and Arthur F. Bentley’s reflections on Knowing and the Known (1989/1948), as 
they distinguish between different levels of describing inquiry into the world we inhabit. At some 
levels of inquiry, we tend to construe the relationship between subject and object, ego and alter, 
in substantialist terms that render the relationship as one derived from preexisting separate 
entities, whereas on another more profound level of inquiry, the relationship itself is seen as the 
producer of difference, individuation, and substantiation.  
Whereas some scholars have seen the approaches of substantialism and relationalism as 
contrasting on (post-epistemological) ontological grounds, this paper will argue with Dewey and 
Bentley that substantialism and relationism are modes of inquiry that aims for description and 
“…representation of the world itself as men report it.” (Dewey & Bentley 1989/1948, p. 101). 
Following Dewey’s pragmatist lead, it is important that we avoid dichotomies – also when we 
discuss modes of inquiry. Ontologizing the discussion about methods of inquiry might in fact prove 
to be unproductive as a traditional move towards ‘first things’. Instead the discussion should look 
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towards ‘last things’, i.e. the experiential consequences of the activities involved in the process of 
inquiry.  The paper will argue that substantialism and relationalism are modes of inquiry that serve 
different purposes, and that choosing one mode of inquiry over another can only be justified 
relative to the problem of the inquiry. Understanding the relationship between the social and the 
material thus presuppose a specification of the problem that trigger the process of inquiry. 
SESSION VI 
The Green Revolution and Enduring Technology-Driven Approaches to Agricultural 
Development and Climate Adaptation 
The Green Revolution-era approach to agricultural development was a top-down focus on 
technology and limited end-user engagement throughout the developing world. This has led to a 
focus on plant breeding over other forms of innovation and a withdrawal from farmer 
involvement (Douthwaite, 2002; Harwood, 2012; Baranski, 2015). Additionally, the Green 
Revolution package of modern seeds, fertilizer, and irrigation was tested under controlled 
experimental conditions but not under the average farmer’s conditions. For example, new wheat 
varieties required precisely timed irrigation, while two thirds of India’s wheat-growing region 
relied on rainfall for irrigation. This, among other factors, has led to a great disparity between 
agriculture in northwestern and northeastern India. Where northeastern India struggles with 
persistent poverty and low agricultural yields, the northwestern wheat-growing region enjoys 
access to agricultural markets and subsidies and higher standards of living. Today, a convergence 
of demographic, ecological, and climatic factors threaten India’s wheat production system. The 
perceived success of the Green Revolution ensures that top-down technological innovations—
e.g., the introduction of climate-tolerant crop varieties—have become the “go-to” solution.
However, the top-down approach risks replicating the inequities of post-Green Revolution India. 
Further, there is a great opportunity cost to investing in technology-heavy solutions at the 
expense of implementing extant adaptation options, policy reform, and resource re-allocation.  
Drawing on my archival and field research in northern India, this presentation demonstrates that 
the Green Revolution paradigm generates inequities that result in real harm to farmers, while its 
overwhelming dominance ensures that any attempt to address these inequities—for instance, 
including end-users in development—is doomed to fail. I introduce alternatives to the Green 
Revolution paradigm, such as participatory agricultural research and Boru Douthwaite’s learning 
selection model, that engage end-users in technology development, and examine the trajectory of 
these alternatives within mainstream agricultural development.  
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Epistemology driving policy?: Project Hindsight and the role of empirical studies in 
informing debates on the linear model of innovation 
Abstract: A potential role for the epistemology of engineering to help policy for engineering 
and science is through an understanding of innovation that can prioritize how research and 
development (R&D) investments should be made. Historians and philosophers of engineering 
have long debated the linear model of innovation, where improvements in basic science lead 
to applied science and subsequently technology and engineering advances. The linear model 
has both budget implications, in that research and development (R&D) budgets should be 
sized accordingly, and policy implications, in that new engineering advances should ideally 
be chosen based upon results from earlier scientific advances. The majority of historians are 
skeptical of the accuracy of the linear model (Pirtle 2013, Mowery and Rosenberg 1979, 
Szajnfarber and Weigel 2013), while others (Edgerton 2004) argue that the model in some 
ways is an intellectual straw man. Despite decades of scholarship, conversations among 
engineering managers often bemoan the lack of data and guidance to help guide R&D 
prioritization, and rhetoric at high levels of government still has not significantly moved 
beyond the linear model (Narayanamurti et al 2013). 
I will explore policy options to get useful data to guide R&D funding, focusing on the 
controversial 1963-1969 Project Hindsight from the U.S. Department of Defense. Hindsight 
studied 20 weapons systems developments that occurred from 1947-1962 by having teams of 
researchers do case studies on the developments’ histories. The Project Hindsight report is 
mentioned in major discussions of the linear model, with counter-studies and articles 
attacking its framework and rigor.  
I will present the results of a detailed study of Hindsight, arguing that key timeframe and 
framework criticisms (Kreilkamp 1971, Mowery and Rosenberg 1979) are flawed. The major 
criticism about the too-short 20 year timeframe used in Hindsight’s analysis is belied by 
Hindsight’s data on the frequency of innovation events, which tapered off only a few years 
before authorization of a program. Criticisms of the framework of innovation events are more 
nuanced, but recent qualitative social science approaches to coding support and could 
augment what was done there. Interestingly, detailed analysis of the data in the several 
hundred page Hindsight final report (Insenson 1969) appears to be non-existent, which is 
remarkable as Hindsight had a comprehensiveness that has not been replicated in later studies. 
This analysis helps reinforce the suspicion that Hindsight has not been repeated more out of 
fear of political controversy rather than a criticism of research methods (Guston 2007).  
There are still challenges in a Hindsight-like approach and ways for insights in epistemology 
to help guide such study, particularly in how to define key innovation events and the 
relationship between them. I will also explore political and social issues that limit any 
empirical study from being useful in informing R&D policy. Further, I will argue that 
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Hindsight data provides a richness that may help in in bridging and making accessible 
alternative models of innovation for practicing engineering managers. 
*All views and opinions expressed in this paper are the views of the author and do not
necessarily represent NASA or the United States Government. 
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Moore's law and Technological Determinism, Revisited 
In 2005, the author published a paper in the journal of the Society for the History of Technology, 
regarding the implications for history of the advances in semiconductor capabilities, predicted by 
Gordon Moore in 1965. The paper argued that Moore’s Law challenged that Society’s consensus 
that technology was in part “socially constructed”—that technology does not proceed 
autonomously, that it does not impact (or “determine”) society as it progresses. The author noted 
that the political and social events of the five decades since the publication of Moore’s essay – 
the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, assassinations, energy and environmental crises, 
etc.—seemed to have no effect on the steady, approximately 18-month doubling of 
semiconductor density. The author also noted that attempts to resist the automatic adoption of 
devices or software made possible by these advances failed. The paper cited two such examples, 
which in 2005 were debated among critics of technology and society, but which in the 
intervening years have become so commonplace that few realize there ever was a debate about 
their adoption. The example on the hardware side was the adoption of digital cameras over 
traditional chemical-based film photography. The example on the software side was the adoption 
of PowerPoint™ as an aid to presentations and lectures. Whereas acceptance of digital imaging 
could be argued on purely technical grounds (although that excludes the arguments of film 
photography as an art form), the rapid acceptance of PowerPoint, even in the face of serious 
criticism, is a better indication of the power of advancing digital technology to “determine” the 
social milieu.  
This paper revisits that 2005 essay, and notes, on the one hand, the recent developments in 
semiconductors and computer power, and on the other, how historians of technology have 
responded to recent advances in computing. Semiconductor technology is shown to continue to 
advance, although issues of heat dissipation and the cost of fabrication plants have had an impact 
on that process. The massive acceptance of new devices and technologies enabled by these 
advances continues, however. The best example from recent history is the adoption of the 
smartphone and how it rendered the traditional telephone, music player, broadcast radio, paper 
maps, and other information media obsolete. We see that in 2005 criticism, no matter how well-
argued, of the rapid acceptance of digital technology was fruitless. The paper concludes with 
suggestions for how one might address the issue of whether are lives are bound to be determined 
by these advances or not. 
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Judgement, Engineering and Engineering Judgement 
Dan McLaughlin 
1. What is judgement? What is engineering judgement? How are the skills and activities of the
“engineering profession” uniquely different from those common to everyone? In one sense,
engineering judgement applies only to those technical skills and activities uniquely found within
the field of engineering. In a broader sense, however, it also applies to other skills and activities
common to non-engineers but which are expected to be exhibited by those in the engineering
profession.
2. I will explore these perspectives by contrasting works by Michael Davis, Billy Vaughn Koen and
Taft Broome and their views on the nature of engineering, judgement, and engineering
judgement.
3. Davis proposes that engineering judgement is similar to the Greek term “phronesis” but
ultimately rejects the equivalence of the two terms.
a. The field of meaning of the English term “good judgement” and the Greek term
phronesis overlap but have differences that Davis deems significant. These include that
phronesis is a general term that is intended to relate to the whole of a virtuous life. The
term “judgement” is used in a narrower way. A person can be said to have good
judgement in one area of life but not in another. A person with phronesis displays that
trait in all areas of life or he does not have phronesis at all
b. To Davis, engineering is a profession. The term engineer only applies to a subset of the
human race. Engineering ethics applies only to engineers and is not applicable to those
outside of the profession. It seems that Engineering Judgement is a standard of
judgement applicable only to engineers. Phronesis, on the other hand, is a standard
applicable to everyone.
4. Koen, in contrast to Davis, sees the practice of engineering, not as the activity of a subset of the
human race, but as a universal description of all the activities of mankind. If one takes this view then
“engineering judgement” is synonymous with phronesis.
5. Broome proposes that engineers conceptualize the relation of mathematics to reality differently
than scientists, mathematicians and the general public.  Engineers operate in a "hyperreality"
(Broome).  This allows Engineers to exercise judgement in the application of scientific theory to
reality in a way that is unique to those in the profession of engineering. This might fall under the
greek category of techne, that is, technical skill.
6. Engineers can be said to have engineering judgement in the sense that no one but engineers can
practice judgement within this hyperreality. This is a necessary condition, however it is not
sufficient.  Engineers are expected to be adept at other activities and skills common to many
professions such as judging risk versus reward, problem solving and design.
7. Engineering judgement includes: 1. Unique judgement which applies to the specific technical skill
(techne) unique to engineering. 2. Judgement in specific skills expected of but not unique to
engineers. 3. Phronesis type of judgement applicable to all persons. And 4. The ability to utilize these
three types of judgement simultaneously and symbiotically.
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Technology, Uncertainty, and the Good Life: Rediscovering Lessons from Ancient Philosophy 
Tonatiuh Rodriguez-Nikl, Ph.D., P.E. 
The engineering profession has been described as harnessing the materials and forces of nature for the 
benefit of humankind, a goal that it has accomplished over much of its history. However, contemporary 
challenges bring into question how well we can harness nature and to what extent technological artifacts 
are beneficial.  
There is a well-known litany of examples of unintended consequences resulting from engineering 
projects. Systems researchers have shown that increasingly tight global networks result in 
interconnected risks and higher chances of catastrophic, cascading failures at a global scale. This goes 
beyond unintended consequences, which often have smaller effects than the original problem and might 
be engineered away, to the possibility that new technologies may prove far more disastrous than 
beneficial.  
It is also unclear to what extent new technology benefits humankind. It would be folly to argue 
otherwise regarding early technological developments, such as clean water and antibiotics. Today in 
affluent countries, it is much harder to give technology the same level of importance. Eradicating polio 
is one thing; it is quite another to provide convenience and entertainment far above basic needs, 
especially when these levels of consumption negatively impact the environment and increase stress. This 
point becomes especially poignant when considering evidence that beyond a certain minimum, 
happiness and life satisfaction are uncorrelated with income.  
It seems that we in the affluent West have an impoverished conceptual scheme for understanding our 
needs and the means to achieve them. Technology has become a secular religion, and we believe that it 
is the solution to all of our ills. We can see this at the individual scale, where we delegate our character 
development to life-hacking apps, and at the global scale, where many prefer to ignore climate change 
with the expectation that we will be able to geo-engineer the problem away. Although technology is not 
always the answer to our problems and may often cause even greater problems, we have become ill-
equipped to think of challenges and solutions as anything but technological in nature.  
These considerations describe the need for an interdisciplinary line of inquiry to catalogue what is 
known about our ability to control nature (e.g., complex systems theory) and both individual and 
collective well-being (e.g., psychology and the social sciences); and to reinterpret, within this context, 
the rich extant body of philosophical guidance. This focuses on the latter aspect, specifically: (a) the 
treatment of fortune in ancient philosophy; (b) the practical focus in ancient philosophy on actually 
living well, rather than impressing other philosophers with papers; (c) the concepts of eudaimonia 
(human flourishing) and phronesis (practical judgment); and (d) insight from some of the traditions that 
find meaning in areas other than continual pursuit of worldly pleasures, such as Stoicism, Epicureanism, 
Buddhism, and Christianity. Lessons from each of these are applied both to personal and professional 
settings in engineering and technology. Of special interest are the popular goals of sustainability and 
resilience, which face significant barriers that can be informed by the present discussion. 
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How many kinds of Engineering Ethics? 
The focus of this paper is the increasing diversification and fragmentation in approaches to teaching 
engineering ethics with Hess and Fore (2017) recently declaring that “there is neither a consensus 
..regarding which strategies are most effective…nor which ends are most important” . There is 
increasing dissatisfaction with the dominant approach which relies on the use of case studies 
involving ethical dilemmas and focuses on professional code of ethics (Colby and Sullivan 2008). 
There have been calls to replace the dominant approach (see Conlon and Zandvoort 2011) with a 
focus on macro ethical issues (Herkert 2005); to focus on the daily routines of engineering/ design 
practice (Lynch and Kline 2000); to adopt approaches based on social ethics or aspirational ethics 
(Bowen 2009); and/or  to engage with the philosophy of technology (Son 2008) or with Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) (Lynch and Kline 2000, Swierstra and  Jelsma 2006). This has implications 
for both the development of the field as a coherent academic discipline and the way in which ethical 
problems are understood in engineering but also presents quite a challenge to those attempting to 
integrate ethics into engineering programmes.  
Given a divergence in approaches it is necessary to develop tools to understand these different 
approaches and how they might relate to each other. Drawing on social theory, this exploratory 
paper attempts to do so. 
Rather than focus on the detail of provision the aim is to explore the ontological assumption 
underlying different approaches to the subject by focusing on a number of binary categorisations 
which may be found in the literature: macro/micro (Herkert 2005); internalist/externalist (Lynch and 
Kline 2000, Verbeek 2008)  and agency/structure (Swierstra and  Jelsma 2006). The argument is 
simple enough in that how we see engineering ethics, and define its purpose, will inform our 
approach to teaching and researching it.  This will, it is argued, rely on our social ontology: how we 
conceptualise social reality, including how we undertand the relationship between social structures 
and human action.  A key focus in this paper is the manner in which different approaches address 
the individual responsibility of engineers and their capacity to meet their responsibilities in light of 
structural constraints that they might face.  A related issue is how different approach choose to 
conceptualise these constraints. 
Two main conclusions will be drawn. Firstly, there is a conflation of two issues in the demand to shift 
to a macro approach, and that the shift to broadening the scope of engineering ethics does not, of 
necessity, involve a focus on whether engineers are enabled or constrained, by the environments in 
which they work, to achieve the goals of the profession in holding paramount the health, safety and 
welfare of the public. Secondly, widening the scope of engineering ethics does not obviate the need 
to maintain a focus on the agency (and responsibilities of engineers)(Davis 2006).  While arguing for 
a focus on agency/structure relations as the key analytic focus those teaching engineering ethics 
need to be aware of various problematic ways in which this relationship has been articulated in 
social theory. It will be argued that Critical Realism (Archer 1996) offers a way of examining this 
relationship by using “analytical dualism” to examine the “conditioning” role of the social structure 
but also the role of social actors in shaping that social structure.  
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Ethics and Chatbots: Beyond Privacy and Rogue AI 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is continuing to have a profound and indelible effect on human life.  
This includes non-embodied AI agents that are designed to interact socially with humans, often 
referred to as chatbots.  Numerous ethical issues are emerging related to the design and behavior 
of chatbots.  It does not take too long into a conversation about them before the issue of privacy 
is mentioned as a paramount concern.  Worries about the existential threat of AI, which have 
even been uttered by luminaries in the technology world, often arise as well (Sparkes 2015).  Of 
course, these are important to address. Yet many other ethical issues pertaining to AI, and 
chatbots more specifically, warrant attention.  For instance, an important ethical issue raised by 
chatbots is the downstream employment effects that the technology could have.  Moreover, 
chatbots may behave in ways that are difficult to predict; this point is illustrated by the recent 
case of the Facebook robots that invented a new language in order to streamline the goals they 
sought to achieve (Field 2017).  User frustration is another relevant ethical issue, which is keenly 
illustrated by the anger people already express against automated customer service agents.   
Deliberate manipulation by users arises as well, an issue made apparent by the way in which 
Internet users directed Microsoft’s Tay chatbot to utter racist slurs (Kleeman 2016). Other issues 
include bias, overtrust of chatbots, and potential effects of chatbots on human-to-human 
interaction. 
Guidance for engineering and computing professionals regarding their responsibility for 
addressing such issues has traditionally been provided by IEEE, ACM, and other professional 
organizations through their codes of ethics.  Recently, IEEE has focused more directly on AI and 
ethical design, through revisions to its code of ethics and through major initiatives such as 
Ethically Aligned Design (IEEE 2016).  Within these contexts, the goal of this presentation is 
twofold:  first, we will provide an overview of key ethical issues related to the design and 
deployment of chatbots.  Second, we will discuss the associated ethical responsibilities of 
engineering and computing professionals (including design engineers, computer scientists, and 
others who are involved in the design, testing, and deployment of chatbots), and evaluate the 
adequacy of codes of ethics and other initiatives by professional societies in identifying and 
enforcing such responsibilities. 
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Abstract 
Large-scale information collection and dissemination practices are acquiring 
greater economic and political significance in the everyday lives of individuals.  Privacy 
issues are becoming more complex as “big data” and machine learning replace traditional 
forms of dossier collection, statistical analysis, and archiving.  This paper explores how a 
number of engineering and business initiatives have incorporated (or failed to 
incorporate) privacy concerns into their strategies for consumer engagement and service 
delivery, with an emphasis on the US and UK contexts.   It analyzes personal reputation 
management services as well as the growing number of systems that purport to protect 
consumers from identity theft and related problems.  The paper explores from an 
interdisciplinary perspective the social responsibility of engineers to deal with these 
privacy-related concerns in their systems design and implementation efforts. 
The enormous amounts of data associated with social media systems and mobile 
applications as well as environmental systems such as water meters have increased the 
number of facial recognition, locational tracking, socioeconomic analysis, and related 
practices being conducted by corporations as well as governmental agencies.  
Corporations and governmental agencies often couple and reinforce their respective data-
collection efforts, which can magnify the difficulty of discerning legitimate and 
actionable consumer concerns and mapping practical modes for addressing them.  
Consumers who pose requests as to what kinds of information is being held about them 
by organizations and as to how it is being used can be frustrated by the lack of specificity 
in the responses they receive (if any).   This paper will explore from a critical perspective 
specific ways in which some organizations have often framed these consumer privacy 
issues as potential venues for product development and even entrepreneurship, seeking 
either to enhance existing products and services or develop new ones. 
The paper projects some of the emerging controversies about consumer privacy 
that technological developments toward a cashless society (with applications such as 
Apple Pay) and autonomous vehicles (driverless cars) are engendering.  In recent years, 
characterizations of privacy have often involved the concept of information control-- the 
ability of the individual to control the dissemination of personal information; expressions 
involving feelings of personal control are often intertwined in current privacy discourse.   
Few aspects of political and social lives are without dimensions that relate to privacy, and 
thus the dimensions of the expression of privacy-related feelings are of critical 
importance.  Individuals who are deprived of privacy can be disempowered in their 
specific economic functions (such as obtaining credit and employment) as well as their 
larger citizenship interests.  Privacy issues involving geographical information systems 
(GIS) can deal with the appropriateness of the modes for information collection about 
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location (including the use of drones), the incorporation of locational data in multiple 
applications and purposes, as well as the stewardship of data (for example, protection 
against security violations).   The paper analyzes several case studies of engineering and 
business interaction with these issues; it contrasts US and UK approaches toward privacy 
concerns with those of the European Union (EU) and addresses implications for cross-
border data flow.  
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